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Abstract: Inequality of opportunity, particularly when overlaid with racial, ethnic, or cultural differ-
ences, increases the social distance between individuals, which is widely believed to limit the scope of
cooperation. A central question, then, is how to bridge such divides. We study the effects of a major
citizenship reform in Germany—the introduction of birthright citizenship on January 1, 2000—in terms
of inter-group cooperation and social segregation between immigrant and native youth. We hypothesize
that endowing immigrant children with citizenship rights levels the playing field between them and their
native peers, with possible spill-overs into the domain of social interactions. Our unique setup connects
a large-scale lab-in-the-field experiment based on the investment game with the citizenship reform by
exploiting the quasi-random assignment of citizenship rights around its cut-off date. Immigrant youth
born prior to the reform display high levels of cooperation toward other immigrants, but low levels of
cooperation toward natives. The introduction of birthright citizenship caused male, but not female, im-
migrants to significantly increase their cooperativeness toward natives. This effect is accompanied by a
near-closure of the educational achievement gap between young immigrant men and their native peers.
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I. Introduction
Immigration has shaped, and continues to shape, many nations. This brings with it the challenge
of integrating immigrants and their children into society. Among economists, one important take on
integration—and on policies that promote it—is to emphasize convergence in the outcomes of immigrants
and those of the host population in economic dimensions such as educational attainment and labor market
participation (Card and Krueger [1992]; Algan et al. [2010]; Sweetman and van Ours [2014]).
Another fundamental, but much less scrutinized, aspect of integration pertains to social interactions be-
tween immigrants and natives. Many such interactions, from everyday private exchanges to the provision
of neighborhood amenities to working in teams, are not governed by enforceable contracts. Therefore,
they almost always involve conflicts of interest and hold-up problems, and socially-efficient outcomes will
only be achieved if people are willing to cooperate.
However, socioeconomic differences between immigrants and natives can act as a barrier to cooperation.
For example, economic inequality or social exclusion—particularly when overlaid with racial, ethnic, or
cultural differences—increases the social distance between individuals, which is widely believed to limit
the scope of cooperation (Hoffman et al. [1996]). It is also conceivable that individuals from disadvantaged
groups adopt oppositional identities, which is said to involve “anti-social” behavior (Akerlof and Kranton
[2000]). Thus, to think clearly about integration interventions, it is not enough to know about their impact
in terms of educational or occupational outcomes; we should also be concerned about their potential in
fostering cooperation between individuals of diverse backgrounds and perspectives.
To examine this issue, this paper zooms in on one fundamental mechanism for immigrant inclusion.
Specifically, we study the effects of a major citizenship reform in Germany—the introduction of birthright
citizenship on January 1, 2000—in terms of inter-group cooperation and social segregation between
immigrant and native youth. Our unique setup combines the advantages of experimental economics in
studying in-group/out-group phenomena (Fershtman and Gneezy [2001]; Chen and Li [2009]) with the
way in which labor economists have come to frame causal questions. In particular, we (i) conducted
an incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment based on the investment (or “trust”) game with a sample of
nearly 4,500 adolescents;1 (ii) allowed participants to condition their strategies on the identity of their
opponents; (iii) linked the experimental data with information from an extensive socioeconomic survey;
and (iv) chose a sample design that allows us to connect the experiment with the citizenship reform using
quasi-experimental identification strategies.
Birthright citizenship—the rule that all children born on a nation’s soil obtain citizenship at birth—is
subject to much controversy. For example, when Donald Trump became the first major U.S. presidential
contender to endorse ending birthright citizenship, some saw it as an effective way of containing illegal
immigration and birth tourism.2 Yet others rallied to point out that birthright citizenship is one of the
most powerful mechanisms of social inclusion (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
[2015]). This controversy, and similar debates in Europe, is surprisingly uninformed by reliable evidence
from countries that have changed their approach to birthright citizenship.
We exploit such a change and take a first step towards tracing its impact on the lives of young im-
migrants. Our main idea is as follows. Birthright citizenship endows immigrant children with the host
country’s nationality at birth and, thus, with the same legal rights, and the attendant political and eco-
nomic opportunities, as their native counterparts. The existing literature suggests that this could have
1As will be explained in more detail below, we have avoided selection in and attrition from the experiment by running
it in 219 classes of 57 German schools during regular school hours in the final year of compulsory schooling. Throughout,
we will use the terms children, youth and adolescents interchangeably to refer to the participants in our study.
2See, for example, a CNN article dated 18 August 2015, “Birthright citizenship: Can Donald Trump change the con-
stitution?” (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/18/politics/birthright-citizenship-trump-constitution/index.html,
accessed Oct 10, 2017)).
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had (at least) two relevant consequences: it might have induced immigrant parents to better integrate
into the host society (Avitabile et al. [2013]); and it may have triggered human capital investments by
immigrant parents, with positive effects on their children’s educational integration (Felfe et al. [2016]).
These effects contribute to levelling the playing field between immigrant and native youth and reduce
the social distance between them. Therefore, we held the expectation that the introduction of birthright
citizenship might have spilled over into the sphere of inter-group cooperation. We test this hypothesis
among the first cohort of immigrant children affected by the reform in their final year of compulsory
schooling, more than 15 years after the policy took effect.
The context of our study is Germany, the OECD’s second largest country of immigration after the
United States (OECD [2014]). Currently, immigrant youth account for one-third of Germany’s children
under the age of 15, and the largest minority group of youths, by far, are immigrant children of Turkish
origin. Our own survey, as well as other household surveys, suggests that there are several major dividing
lines between them and their native peers. The first is religion: the majority of native German children
have a Christian religious affiliation, while Islam is the dominant religion among immigrant children.
Second, immigrant children are more likely than non-immigrant children to have parents with low educa-
tional attainment and to grow up in low-income conditions. Third, a good deal of evidence also indicates
that immigrant children are outperformed by their German peers along multiple indicators of academic
achievement (Dustmann et al. [2012]). Thus, we are dealing with native and immigrant children who are
strongly segmented in terms of cultural and social characteristics.
Our lab-in-the-field experiment builds on the pioneering work of Fershtman and Gneezy [2001], who
used the investment game (Berg et al. [1995]) to study non-market interactions between real social groups.
The advantage of using an incentivized experiment rather than a questionnaire is, as succinctly put by
Fershtman and Gneezy [2001], that it captures people’s behavior and not what people claim or believe
to be their own behavior. We take the investment game as a vehicle to measure the extent to which
individuals of different social identities are willing to cooperate, and the version we implement is based
on the following idea. In a segmented migration society such as Germany, “being a native” or “being an
immigrant” are amongst the core attributes of individuals (next to gender) that determine their social
identities. Moreover, these attributes are ubiquitous and easy to perceive, and therefore, they are likely
to feed into social interactions. Thus, using the strategy-vector method (Selten [1967]; Falk and Zehnder
[2013]), we allowed participants to condition their decisions on the gender and migration background of
their opponents.3 Our main measure for intra- versus inter-group cooperation is the in-group/out-group
investment gap that senders reveal in the first stage of the investment game. For natives it is the amount
they send to other natives relative to the quantity they send to immigrants, while for immigrants it is
the amount they send to other immigrants relative to the quantity they send to natives.
Based on the experiment, we obtain three insights that set the scene for our main question. First,
the investment behavior of immigrant children, both boys and girls, reveals a marked gap between intra-
and inter-group cooperation: on average, they transfer roughly 60% of their endowment to other immi-
grants, while their investments to native German children are 13% lower. This difference is particularly
pronounced among youth of Turkish origin, for whom we observe an in-group/out-group investment gap
of more than 20%. Second, we show that immigrants’ low out-group cooperation is to a large extent
explained by asymmetric other-regarding preferences toward immigrants and natives, and only to a small
extent by asymmetric beliefs about whether their opponents will exploit them. This, together with the
fact that immigrants’ low out-group cooperation involves a willingness to sacrifice money, suggests that
immigrants’ cooperative decision making is shaped by parochial altruism (Choi and Bowles [2007]). Third,
differently from immigrant youth, natives effectively cooperate with both in-group and out-group mem-
3For example, in the first stage of the investment game, participants had to decide how much of their initial endowment
to send to a boy/girl with German-born/foreign-born parents.
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bers: on average, they transfer 58% of their endowment to other natives, and their out-group investments
to immigrants are only marginally lower.
Having established this, we ask: Does birthright citizenship foster cooperation between immigrant and
native youth? To that end, we exploit the following policy change. Until December 31, 1999, Germany
granted birthright citizenship based on jus sanguinis (right of blood), i.e., only children born to German
nationals received citizenship at birth. After January 1, 2000, the regime changed to a restricted version
of jus soli (right of soil), i.e., every child born on German territory gained a conditional right to German
citizenship.4 This setting provides us with a birth date eligibility cut-off, which serves as our source
of identification. In particular, exploiting the quasi-random assignment of birthright citizenship around
the cut-off, we analyze whether the policy caused discontinuities in immigrant children’s propensity to
cooperate with in-group and out-group members.
Our main finding is that the introduction of jus soli caused male, but not female, immigrants to
significantly increase their cooperativeness towards natives. We observe an in-group/out-group investment
gap of 15% for immigrant boys born pre-policy, while for those born under jus soli, it is 11 percentage
points, or almost 70% lower. This effect is entirely driven by an increase in out-group cooperation.
Moreover, it is particularly pronounced for boys of Turkish origin: for those born pre-policy, the in-
group/out-group investment gap amounts to 20%, which completely vanishes for those born post-policy.
For immigrant girls, the birth date cut-off does not matter at all: among those born pre-policy, investments
to immigrants exceed investments to natives by 17%, and this difference persists for those born post-
policy. Several robustness checks corroborate these results.
Finally, we explore possible explanations for the reform effect and question why it is gender-specific.
For immigrant boys, we find that the policy not only cause more cooperation with natives; it also led to
a near-closure of a substantial pre-existing educational achievement gap between them and their native
peers. Thus, education relative to natives appears to be an important factor in immigrant boys’ in-
group/out-group cooperation and is our main explanation for the reform effect on out-group cooperation.
This explanation, however, does not hold for girls: those born pre-policy were not lagging much behind
their native female peers educationally, but nevertheless were unwilling to cooperate with them in the
experiment; moreover, the policy did not change this picture.
This raises an intriguing question for future research: What explains immigrant girls’ low out-group
cooperation and the lack of an effect of increased opportunities? Although our study was not set up to
address this unanticipated (by us) result, we take some first steps to explore it. Across many immigrant
groups, girls are socialized to be “keepers of the culture”. The existing literature suggests that this may
have two relevant consequences: immigrant girls are more likely than immigrant boys to self-identify
with their parents’ immigrant origins; and they are more likely to face high levels of parent-child conflict
and, consequently, to have lower self-esteem. To the extent that high ethnic self-identification and low
self-esteem have been linked to out-group discrimination (Hogg and Abrams [1990]; Rubin and Hewstone
[1998]), we consider these as plausible explanations for the gender-specific patterns we have uncovered.
Based on our survey, we provide descriptive evidence that is consistent with these explanations.
Our study relies on a novel combination of a lab-in-the-field experiment with a natural experiment and
provides novel insights into the interface between immigration, citizenship and inter-group cooperation.
It builds upon and connects a number of papers that span the fields of experimental economics, labor
economics, and political science. Our experimental design is an outgrowth of ideas developed by Fersht-
man and Gneezy [2001]. In their experiments with Ashkenazi (Eastern) and Sephardi (Western) Jews in
Israel, they find systematic discrimination towards men of Eastern origin. Inspired by this work, there
4As further detailed below, the conditionality attached to jus soli, fulfilled by a large majority of immigrant families at
the time of the reform, was that at least one parent had been a legal resident in Germany for eight years or more at the
time of birth of the child.
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has developed a small but active stream of literature in experimental economics on cooperation, trust,
and discrimination between immigrants and natives. For instance, Guillen and Ji [2011] focus on do-
mestic university students and their Asian international peers in Australia; Cox and Orman [2015] study
first-generation immigrants and native-born Americans in the United States; and Cettolin and Suetens
[2017] address non-Western immigrants and native Dutch in the Netherlands. A study that is close in
spirit to ours is Albrecht and Smerdon [2016]. They exploit a refugee resettlement to a small rural town
in Australia to study the effects of a migration shock on social capital. Combining trust data from an
lab-in-the-field experiment with survey data from both treatment and similar control towns, they find
that citizens in the treated town (i.e., who experienced the refugee resettlement) trust refugees relatively
more than those in untreated towns.
Our study connects the literature described above with a number of studies in labor economics and
political science that explore the effects of citizenship on immigrants. Chiswick [1978] was among the first
to analyze the effect of Americanization on the earnings of foreign-born men. More recent contributions
have focused on the effects of citizenship on wage growth (Bratsberg et al. [2002]; Steinhardt [2012]),
employment prospects (Fouge`re and Safi [2009]; Gathmann and Keller [2017]) and remittances (Piracha
and Zhu [2012]). Hainmueller et al. [2017] exploit the quasi-random assignment of citizenship in Swiss
municipalities that used referendums to decide on the naturalization applications of immigrants. Their
main finding is that receiving the host country’s nationality strongly improves immigrants’ long-term
social integration. Turning to the effects of birthright citizenship, there is evidence that immigrant
parents are more likely to stay in the host country and to interact with the local community if their
children are entitled to the host country’s nationality at birth (Avitabile et al. [2013]; Sajons [2016]). In
a previous paper, a subset of us (Felfe et al. [2016]) found that the introduction of birthright citizenship
in Germany had positive effects on immigrant children’s educational outcomes both in the short and the
long term. Avitabile et al. [2014] report that birthright citizenship leads to a reduction in immigrant
fertility and improved health outcomes for immigrant children.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we focus on the lab-in-the-field
experiment: first we describe our setting, sample and experimental design; then, we provide basic results
on intra- and inter-group cooperation among Germany’s youth. Section III connects the lab-in-the-field
experiment with the natural experiment of Germany’s introduction of birthright citizenship. It begins
with a description of the institutional background and empirical strategy, followed by the main results on
the reform effect and its possible explanations. Section IV concludes by offering some thoughts on policy
implications and directions for future research. Three Appendices collect additional material.
II. The Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
II.A. Study Design
Our study took place between June and November 2015 and was conducted in 219 classes of 57 German
schools during regular school hours. At the time of the experiment, all participants were in their final
year of compulsory schooling, and thus 15 to 16 years of age at the time of the study.
Setting, Subject Pool, and Sample Description
The study was run in two German federal states: Schleswig-Holstein (SH), where the duration of com-
pulsory schooling is nine years; and North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), where compulsory education lasts
for ten years. In both federal states, a school year starts in August/September and ends in June/July.
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There were two waves of data collection. In the first wave, lasting from June 2 to July 16, our target
population were all 9th graders from 31 schools (spread over 122 classes) in six cities of SH.5 In the second
wave, lasting from October 19 to November 16, we targeted all 10th graders of 26 schools (spread over
97 classes) in two cities of NRW.6 Our chosen target populations allow us to focus on a school cohort
composed of children mainly born in 1999 and 2000. This, in turn, will be crucial for identifying the
effects of a major German citizenship reform that took effect on January 1, 2000 and saw the introduction
of birthright citizenship.
In both SH and NRW, we sought approval for our study by submitting the design and a list of target
schools to the respective ministries of education. Both ministries approved the study and strongly en-
couraged the principals of the targeted schools to participate. Upon approval, we contacted the principals
directly and asked for formal permission to conduct the experiment and survey in all classes of grade nine
in SH and in all classes of grade ten in NRW. The 57 participating schools belong to five school types: ten
schools are secondary general schools (“Hauptschule”); eight are intermediate schools (“Realschule”); 29
are comprehensive schools without the final years of grammar school-type education (“Gesamtschule ohne
gymnasialer Oberstufe”); eight are comprehensive schools with the final years of grammar school-type
education (“Gesamtschule mit gymnasialer Oberstufe”); and two are grammar schools or high schools
(“Gymnasium”). Two weeks prior to the study, school principals informed parents about the study
and gave them an opt-out option, i.e., parents could proscribe their children’s participation.7 Moreover,
immediately before the experiment started, all students present in class were informed by us that partic-
ipation was voluntary. The experiment was run at the school class-level during two regular consecutive
school hours.
On the days we conducted the study, a total of 4,634 students were present in the 219 classes. Parents
made use of the opt-out option for 44 of them (less than 1%), while 154 students (3.5%) chose to opt
out themselves. Thus, 4,436 students participated in the study. Of those, 133 participants did not fully
complete the experimental task, while 226 did not provide the survey information necessary for our basic
analysis (i.e., own gender and/or parental migration background). This leaves us with a baseline sample
of 4,077 students.
The study consisted of two parts, the investment game (described in detail below) and an extensive
socioeconomic survey. Each part lasted approximately one school hour (45 minutes), and the order of
the two parts was randomized on a daily basis in order to avoid any potential bias stemming from that
sequence.8 The study was conducted in regular classrooms and was done by paper and pen. To guarantee
privacy, we installed mobile privacy screens between students.9 We ensured anonymity by assigning a
unique identity code to each participant.
The survey provides information, inter alia, about participants’ date of birth, country of birth, gender,
school achievements, aspirations, preferences and interests, personality traits, and family background.
Two key family background variables are the birth places of both parents, which we use to categorize
participants into three groups: (i) native children, whose parents are both German-born; (ii) immi-
grant children, whose parents are both foreign-born; and (iii) mixed-background children, who have one
German-born and one foreign-born parent. Overall, according to our definitions, the sample comprises
2,201 native children (54%), 1,218 immigrant children (30%) and 658 mixed-background children (16%).
Roughly 77% of all immigrant children in our sample are German-born (i.e., second-generation immi-
5The cities are Flensburg, Kiel, Lu¨beck, Neumu¨nster, Elmshorn, and Pinneberg, with population sizes ranging from
42,266 in Pinneberg to 246,306 in Kiel.
6The cities are Duisburg and Wuppertal, with population sizes of 491,231 and 350,046, respectively.
7Parents were, however, not informed about the objectives of the study.
8Because none of our experimental results depends qualitatively on the order of events in the session (i.e., whether the
survey or the experiment was conducted first), we pool the data of the two types of sessions in the analysis.
9See Figure B.1 in Appendix B for a photo of a classroom setup.
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grants), while 23% are foreign-born (i.e., first-generation immigrants).
We focus on native and immigrant children, while discussing results for mixed-background children
only in passing. Thus, the following sample description is confined to the former two groups (for details,
see Appendix Table A.1). In Germany, the largest minority group of youths, by far, are immigrant
children of Turkish origin. This is also evident in our sample. Specifically, 38% of immigrant children
have parents who are Turkish-born, 14% have Middle-Eastern or African backgrounds, 12% have parents
born in a post-Soviet country, 11% have parents from a Balkan country, 11% have Eastern European
backgrounds, and 14% come from other countries. A comparison of native and immigrant children
suggests several marked differences, of which we mention four. First, roughly one-third of immigrant
children have parents with low educational attainment, while the corresponding share for native children
is just under one-fourth.10 Second, immigrant children are more likely than non-immigrant children to
live in two-parent households (74% vs. 55%). Third, the majority of native children report a Christian
(i.e., Catholic or Protestant) religious affiliation (67%), while the group of immigrants is predominantly
made up of Muslim children (59%). Finally, 69% of immigrant children report that they speak a language
other than German with their parents at home. We interpret this evidence as reflecting the pronounced
cultural, social and economic gaps between native and immigrant children that are also observed in
representative surveys.
The Investment Game: Design and Implementation
Our experiment is based on the standard investment game (Berg et al. [1995]), which consists of two
players, called the first-mover (sender) and the second-mover (receiver). Each player is endowed with
five euros at the beginning of the game. The first-mover decides on the amount to be sent to the second-
mover (x ∈ [0, 5]) in steps of 50 e -cents. The transferred amount is then tripled by the experimenter.
The second-mover is informed about the first-mover’s decision and the transferred amount (3x) and can
then decide whether to send back any amount y ∈ [0, 5 + 3x] to the first-mover. The final payoff for the
first-mover is 5 − x + y and for the second-mover is 5 + 3x − y. The only subgame-perfect equilibrium
prescribes no investment and zero returns, while the social optimum involves “full” cooperation, i.e., the
first-mover invests his entire endowment.
In our experiment, we employed the strategy method, i.e., each participant had to decide as first-
mover and as second-mover. Moreover, and most importantly for the purpose of this paper, we allowed
first-movers to condition their investment decisions on the gender and migration background of possible
interaction partners. We implemented this by letting first-movers decide whether, and if so, how much, to
transfer to each of six possible receiver types (indexed by k): a boy with German parents (S1), a girl with
German parents (S2), a boy with foreign parents (S3), a girl with foreign parents (S4), a boy with foreign
parents who possesses German citizenship (S5), and a girl with foreign parents who possesses German
citizenship (S6).
11 In principle, this setup allows us to understand the extent to which cooperation is
dependent on migration background as well as gender. However, the main task this paper sets itself is to
examine intra- and inter-group cooperation between native and immigrant youth and how it is influenced
by public policy. We will therefore largely abstract away from cooperation conditional on gender, apart
from remarks, when deemed necessary. Thus, we collapse the six choices {S1, ..., S6} into two variables:
a participant’s average investment to natives (SN ) and his or her average investment to immigrants (SI),
10As Appendix Table A.1 also shows, a relatively large proportion of immigrant children report that they do not know
their parents’ educational attainment.
11See Appendix B for the translated decision sheets.
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defined as
SN =
1
2
2∑
k=1
Sk and SI =
1
4
6∑
k=3
Sk.
12
Throughout the paper, we refer to SN as native children’s in-group investments and as immigrant
children’s out-group investments, respectively. Likewise, we refer to SI as native children’s out-group
investments and immigrant children’s in-group investment, respectively. Our main measure for intra-
versus inter-group cooperation is the in-group/out-group investment gap (IG) of senders with and without
migration backgrounds. Formally, it is defined as
IG =
{
SN − SI for native children;
SI − SN for immigrant children.
After participants had completed the first stage of the investment game, they were asked to indicate
on their decision sheet the expected back transfer Ek ∈ [0, 20] from the six possible interaction partners
in steps of ten e -cents.13
At the final stage of the investment game, participants were asked to play the role of second-movers,
and we employed the contingent response method to elicit their back transfers (returns). For example,
on a first decision sheet, participants were asked to decide on their back transfers to a boy with German-
born parents, contingent on the eleven possible investments of the boy as the first mover. Using the
same strategy vector variant, we elicited back payments to the other five potential interaction partners.
Amounts between and including 0 and 5 + 3x in steps of ten e -cents were allowed.
Before the experiment started, the instructions were distributed to all students in class and read out
by an experimenter.14 Students were informed that they would first play the investment game as the
first-mover and thereafter as the second-mover. They were told that they could earn real money and that
their payoffs would depend on their own choices and those of another, randomly assigned experiment
participant from a different school.15 The average payoff in the experiment was e 7.26.16 Participants
received their payoffs no later than two weeks after the experiment took place (in envelopes with their
unique identity codes, distributed by school secretaries or head teachers), which was known to them at
the beginning of the experiment. All participants faced exactly the same decision tasks, instructions, and
payoffs, and all procedures described here were common knowledge.
12Receiver types k ∈ {3, 4} capture all immigrants (i.e., boys and girls with foreign parents), while receiver types k ∈ {5, 6}
capture only the subset of naturalized immigrants (i.e., those who possess German citizenship). The reason we have allowed
for this distinction will become clear in Section III, where we examine the effects of the German citizenship reform. For
our main results, we have chosen not to drop any data, and hence, we compute SI by averaging over their investments
to receiver types k ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6}. That said, our results do not hinge on this specification, i.e., they remain qualitatively
unchanged when we compute SI by averaging over participants’ investments to receiver types k ∈ {3, 4}, i.e., by letting
SI =
1
2
(S3 + S4).
13We chose not to incentivize the elicitation of expectations for reasons of practicality. We thus have to interpret the
results based on expectations cautiously.
14The translated instructions can be found in Appendix B. All sessions were conducted by one leading experimenter—in
most cases, one of the authors—and one or two students assistants, previously trained by us. The experiment followed a
strict protocol that was obeyed in every session.
15To be precise, we calculate final payoffs as follows: (i) we randomly match two participants from two different schools; (ii)
we randomly assign the roles of first-mover and second-mover; (iii) we determine the true type k of both the first-mover and
the second-mover based on survey information on own/other gender and whether parents are German-born or foreign-born;
(iv) we implement the first-mover’s decision for the true type of the second-mover; (v) we implement the second-mover’s
back transfer for the true type of the first-mover and his or her choice implemented in step (iv); and (vi) based on the
pair of choices implemented in steps (iv) and (v), we calculate the participants’ final payoffs. When we implemented this
procedure to calculate participants’ payoffs, we treated mixed-background children as children with foreign-born parents for
pragmatic reasons. The question of the treatment of mixed-background children in the matching procedure was not raised
by participants.
16The maximum payoff was e 20. For participants whose payoffs were lower than e 2, we paid out an unannounced
consolation prize of e 2.
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While decisions might potentially be different between our strategy vector variant and an alternative
direct response method, we are confident that our results do not reflect an experimenter demand effect to
discriminate or a social desirability bias not to discriminate. First, monetary incentives are substantial
and should dominate other considerations. Indeed, data from the representative German Socio-Economic
Panel suggest that the average payout in the experiment corresponds to more than 70% of the average
amount of weekly pocket money given to adolescents with roughly the same characteristics as our partici-
pants. Second, our main results in Section III show that immigrants’ intra- versus inter-group cooperation
in the investment game is linked to an exogenous event, the introduction of birthright citizenship 15 years
before our experiment took place, which is difficult to explain with an experimenter demand effect or a
social desirability bias.
II.B. Results of the Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
In this subsection, we present basic results from our lab-in-the-field experiment. To that end, we exploit
our full baseline sample, which contains the experimental choices of 4,077 participants.
General Investment and Back-Transfer Patterns
We begin with a brief description of general investment and back-transfer patterns. Panel (a) in Figure 1
shows a histogram of all investment decisions in the experiment. On average, first-movers invest e 2.85,
or 57% of their initial endowment. The two most frequent investment choices are transfers of respectively
50 and 100% of the initial endowment. These investment patterns are comparable to what has been
observed in previous experiments based on the investment game.17
Panel (b) in Figure 1 shows (i) averages of second-mover back transfers for each possible first-mover
investment and (ii) average expected back transfers, conditional on the first-mover’s investment. It is
apparent that second-movers show reciprocal behavior, on average: the higher the first-mover investments,
the higher the back transfers. The degree of reciprocity appears to be quite high. For example, second-
movers are willing to send back approximately e 4.50 if they receive e 2.50 from first-movers, which almost
equalizes final payments. Over the whole range of investments, the ratio of paybacks to investments
estimated from an OLS regression is 1.42. Finally, Panel (b) also reveals that, on average, the level of
actual back transfers matches first-movers’ expectations about back transfers almost one-to-one, especially
for intermediate investments.
In-Group/Out-Group Investment Gaps
We now ask whether the migration background of interaction partners affects the investment decisions
of first-movers. For the main part of the analysis, we restrict our sample to native German children (i.e.,
both parents German-born) and their immigrant peers (i.e., both parents foreign-born). At the end of
the section, we briefly discuss the experimental choices of mixed-background children (i.e., one native
and one foreign-born parent).
Figure 2 illustrates the investment choices of native and immigrant children by migration background
of second-movers, both for the entire sample and separately by gender. Several interesting patterns
emerge. First, for native adolescents, the evidence speaks against a strong pattern of unequal treatment
of natives and immigrants. In the full sample [Panel (a)], natives’ in-group investments exceed their out-
group investments by a statistically significant 2.1% (SN = 2.90, SI = 2.84; paired t-test with p < .01).
17For example, the distribution of first-mover investments is quite comparable to that in Falk and Zehnder’s [2013]
experiment in the city of Zurich, which was run with adults.
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Looking at this result separately by gender [Panels (b) and (c)], we observe that there is no in-group/out-
group variation in the investment choices of native girls (SN = 2.70, SI = 2.72). Native boys, by contrast,
reveal moderate in-group favoritism: their in-group investments exceed their out-group investments by a
statistically significant 4.8% (SN = 3.08, SI = 2.94; p < .01). Second, among immigrant children [Panel
(a)], we detect a strong bias against natives that manifests itself in a statistically significant in-group/out-
group investment gap of 13.4 percent (SI = 2.97, SN = 2.62, p < .01). The subgroup results by gender
[Panels (b) and (c)] suggest that this gap is more pronounced for immigrant girls (16.1%; p < .01) than for
immigrant boys (10.1%; p < .01).18 In Figure 3, we look at investment decisions in terms of propensities
to strongly discriminate between in-group and out-group opponents. To do so, we classify participants
as strong discriminators if their average in-group investments exceed their average out-group investments
by 25% or more. The results are quite striking. It can been seen that roughly one-in-three immigrant
children (31.4%) are strong discriminators, while the corresponding share among native children is only
half that (15.6%). This pattern is more pronounced among girls (32.7 v/s 12.1%) than among boys (30.2
v/s 18.6%).
As a regression analogue to the just-described results, we next run the following simple specification:
IG = α0 + α1Immigrant + ε. (1)
The dependent variable is defined for each first-mover as the difference between average in-group invest-
ment and average out-group investment. Immigrant is a binary variable indicating whether a child has
parents who are both foreign-born; the omitted category is native children, i.e., those whose parents are
both German-born. Standard errors are clustered by school type and school location.
Figure 4 presents OLS estimates of Equation (1). In the full sample (labeled “All” on the x-axis),
the mean of the in-group/out-group investment gap is e 0.07 for native children, while for immigrants,
it is a statistically significant e 0.28 higher. Among native boys, the in-group/out-group investment gap
amounts to e 0.14, while for immigrant boys, it is exactly twice as high, with the difference being signifi-
cant at the 1% level. For native girls, the in-group/out-group investment gap is both quantitatively and
statistically indistinguishable from zero (e -0.02), while for immigrant girls it is a statistically significant
e 0.42 higher.
The main message so far is that the scope for cooperation between immigrants and natives is limited
because immigrants, although showing a high willingness to send money to other immigrants, have a low
inclination to invest towards natives. Why is this the case? In the investment game, there are typically
two underlying motives for cooperation: the sender’s beliefs about whether her choice to cooperate will
be exploited by opponents and individual preferences such as other-regarding concerns and risk aversion
(see, e.g., Karlan [2005]; McEvily et al. [2012]; Sapienza et al. [2013]). As describe in Section II.A, we
have elicited the expectations of senders regarding the back-transfer behavior of receivers. Moreover,
given that we have employed the strategy method, we can use individuals’ behavior as receivers as an
indication of their other-regarding preferences. Finally, our survey contains a question on risk attitudes.
Thus, we are able to examine the extent to which the investment behavior of senders is driven by these
three factors.
For brevity, we relegate the details of this analysis to Appendix C and summarize the two main
findings here. First, we run a simple regression of participants’ in-group investments on measures of
their risk attitudes, their social preferences towards in-group members, and their beliefs about in-group
members’ tendency to exploit them. This exercise reveals that senders’ in-group behavior is driven both
18In Appendix Figure A.1, we show how the migration background and gender of game partners affects the investment
decisions of first-movers. Both children with and without migration backgrounds appear to positively and in almost equal
measure differentiate between native girls and native boys and immigrant girls and immigrant boys, respectively.
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by beliefs and social preferences, which is in line with the findings of Sapienza et al. [2013]. Second, we
regress the in-group/out-group investment gap on measures that capture in-group/out-group differences
in participants’ beliefs and preferences. The main finding is that immigrants’ in-group favoritism is to
a large extent explained by differences in other-regarding preferences toward in-group and out-group
members and only to a small extent by asymmetric beliefs. In Appendix C, we also show that, in
our experiment, being matched with out-group opponents involves a loss of money, compared to being
matched with in-group opponents. For immigrants, these losses are almost exclusively explained by
their own in-group favoritism as first-movers. For natives, the payoff losses are largely due to the fact
they receive lower back transfers from immigrant than from native opponents. Taken together, since
immigrants’ low out-group cooperation has a preference-based explanation and involves a willingness to
sacrifice money, one might describe their social exchange behavior as being shaped by parochial altruism
(Choi and Bowles [2007]).
Heterogeneity
We now examine heterogeneity in in-group favoritism across immigrant groups. To that end, we re-
run Equation (1) with the variable Migrant replaced by dummy variables for six mutually exclusive
groups of immigrant children. The first group (Turkey; 461 observations) comprises immigrant children
of Turkish origin—by far the largest minority group of youths in Germany. In the second group (Middle
East & Africa; 280 observations), we pool together immigrant children with Middle-Eastern and African
backgrounds. The third group (Balkan, 137 observations) is made up of immigrant children whose parents
come from a Balkan country. The fourth group contains immigrant children with an Eastern European
background (Eastern Europe; 130 observations), while the fifth group is made up of immigrant children
whose parents come from a post-Soviet country (Post-Soviet ; 130 observations). The final, miscellaneous
group (Other Countries, 176 observations) contains all other immigrant children.
Figure 5 shows that the most pronounced above-average in-group favoritism occurs among immigrant
children of Turkish origin.19 In particular, while the in-group/out-group investment gap for German
native children amounts to e 0.07 (Boys: e 0.14; Girls: e -0.02; see Figure 4), it is e 0.36 (Boys: e 0.24;
Girls: e 0.50) higher for children with Turkish-born parents. The second group of immigrants that
displays above-average in-group favoritism are children with Middle Eastern and African backgrounds,
followed by those whose parents originate from Balkan countries. By contrast, immigrant children whose
parents come from Eastern European and Post-Soviet countries reveal a below-average in-group/out-
group investment bias.20 F-tests on the equality of the estimated coefficients on the dummies Turkey and
Eastern European reject equality at p-values of 0.01 (full sample) and 0.02 (boys), but not for girls with a
p-value of 0.11. A comparison of the estimated coefficients on the dummies Turkey and Post-Soviet yields
a qualitatively similar conclusion. What is noticeable about these results is that the three strongly in-
group biased immigrant groups share the characteristic that they are predominantly made up of children
with a Muslim background (Turkey: 92%, Middle East & Africa: 75%, Balkan: 68%). By contrast, the
religious background of immigrant children with an Eastern European or post-Soviet background—with
shares of Christians of 84% and 61%, respectively—is quite comparable to that of native German children
(67%).
Two final points should be made about the analysis so far. First, we have focused on comparing
the experimental choices of immigrant and native children, but we have been silent on the behavior of
children with mixed-backgrounds. Appendix Figure A.2 reveals that mixed-background children also
favor immigrants over natives when choosing to cooperate (SI = 2.88; SN = 2.69; gap 7.1%; p < .01),
19Note that we do not report estimates of the constant here, which remain the same as in Figure 4.
20The in-group/out-group investment gap of boys from these two immigrant groups is identical to or even lower than that
of German native boys.
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but to a lesser extent than immigrant children and with less-pronounced gender differences. Second,
in discussing the choices of children with migration backgrounds, we have made no distinction between
first-generation (i.e., foreign-born) and second-generation (i.e., German-born) immigrant children. Our
empirical strategy in the next section requires us to narrow our sample to second-generation immigrant
children. Appendix Figure A.3 shows that the the degree of in-group favoritism that we identified in the
investment game does not differ markedly between first- and second-generation immigrant children.
III. The Natural Experiment
This section turns to the main question posed at the outset: can governments of immigrant-receiving
countries foster cooperation between immigrants and natives through policy interventions? We address
this question by analyzing how one important mechanism of immigrant inclusion—birthright citizenship—
affects the way in which immigrant children interact with their native peers.
III.A. Institutional Background: Jus Soli vs. Jus Sanguinis
The path to citizenship for immigrant children varies considerably across immigrant-receiving countries.
In the United States, any person born on the nation’s territory automatically gains U.S. citizenship,
regardless of the nationality or immigration status of the person’s parents. This rule, based on jus soli
(“right of soil”), has been in place since the 19th century and is commonly referred to as birthright
citizenship. By contrast, many countries in Europe have granted citizenship at birth based upon the
principle of jus sanguinis (“right of blood”), meaning that citizenship is inherited through parents rather
than determined by the place of birth. For children born to foreign nationals, this rule implies that citi-
zenship can only be acquired through naturalization (i.e., upon application) later in life. Not surprisingly,
in countries that have jus soli, virtually all native-born children of immigrants have the host-country na-
tionality, while the lowest percentages of immigrant children with host-country nationality are found in
countries that adhere to jus sanguinis (OECD [2011]).
The context of our study is Germany, a country that has recently witnessed a switch from jus sanguinis
to jus soli. Throughout the 20th century, German citizenship could only be acquired by descent from
a German mother and/or a German father. With the turn of the millennium, this principle of jus
sanguinis was replaced by a conditional version of jus soli. In particular, a child born to foreign parents
after December 31, 1999, automatically acquired German nationality at birth if at that time at least one
of his or her parents had been living in Germany habitually and legally for at least eight years. The
reform substantially increased the portion of immigrant children who acquired German nationality by
birth. In particular, for second-generation children born pre-policy, data from the German Microcensus
suggest that roughly 20% qualified for citizenship at birth through jus sanguinis. For second-generation
immigrant children born post-policy, the same data source suggests that 71% were eligible for automatic
birthright citizenship. Among children born to Turkish immigrants this share amounts even to 81%.
Thus, we think of immigrant children with a Turkish background as a high-eligibility treatment group.
The main mechanisms through which we believe the introduction of birthright citizenship could influ-
ence the low out-group cooperation shown by immigrants is educational integration. As discussed earlier,
the school performance of immigrant children in Germany lags behind that of their native counterparts.
In a previous paper, a subset of us (Felfe et al. [2016]) argued that the introduction of birthright citizen-
ship in Germany increased the returns to education for immigrants21 and indeed found evidence for a
21There are several reasons for this. For example, in Germany, citizenship improves immigrant children’s future economic
opportunities by giving them access to employment in the public sector. Evidence also suggests that having the host
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positive human capital effect along a range of indicators of educational achievement and progress. This
reform effect has reduced the distance between immigrant children and their native peers in the sphere
of education, which might affect the extent of their out-group cooperation.22
III.B. Empirical Strategy: Exploiting the Natural Experiment
We consider the introduction of jus soli in Germany on January 1, 2000, as an exogenous event that led
to a quasi-random assignment of birthright citizenship among immigrant children. Since first-generation
immigrant children (i.e., those born outside Germany) were unaffected by the reform, we exclude them
from the analysis and only retain second-generation immigrant children (i.e., those born in Germany) for
the estimation.
To isolate the effect the reform had on immigrant children’s behavior, in a first step, we compare the
experimental decisions of second-generation immigrants born before and after January 1, 2000. In so
doing, it is important to ensure that immigrant parents could not self-select into treatment. Since our
source of identification is a birth date cut-off, the main concern is strategic fertility behavior. We address
this issue in two ways. First, we restrict our sample to children born in the ±4-month window around
January 1, 2000. This ensures that our sample only comprises children who were conceived before July
1999, the month in which the German citizenship reform was ratified. In robustness checks, we further
narrow the window around the reform cut-off date. Second, we implement a “donut” strategy that
drops children born in the ±2-week window around January 1, 2000. This avoids potential selection into
treatment through birth-date-manipulation by parents. Having imposed these sample restrictions, we
examine the behavior of second-generation immigrant children born around the reform’s cut-off date by
estimating the following simple regression model:
IG = β0 + β1Born Post-Reform+ ε, (2)
where IG refers to the in-group/out-group investment gap. The explanatory variable Born Post-Reform
is a binary variable indicating whether an immigrant child was born in the months before (=0) or after
(=1) January 1, 2000. Estimates of the parameter β0 thus capture the in-group/out-group investment gap
among immigrant children born pre-reform, while estimates of β1 show how the behavior of immigrant
children born post-reform differs from the behavior of those born pre-reform.
A simple before-after comparison such as Equation (2) may be partly driven by the fact that immigrant
children born after the policy change are always younger than those born before it. Moreover, it is possible
that the characteristics of parents changes over the year (Buckles and Hungerman [2013]). If age or season
of birth has an impact on immigrant children’s behavior, Equation (2) provides us with a biased estimate
of the reform effect. To net out these potential biases, we construct a second difference between pre-policy
and post-policy native German children (who were unaffected by the reform cut-off date) and estimate
country’s citizenship allows immigrants to earn higher wages (Chiswick [1978]; Steinhardt [2012]), to find jobs more easily
(Fouge`re and Safi [2009]; Gathmann and Keller [2017]), and to steepen their wage-tenure profiles (Bratsberg et al. [2002]).
Moreover, employers frequently face lower administrative costs if they wish to employ a naturalized person rather than a
foreigner. Naturalization might also function as a signaling device for the employer for better integration, which in turn
may influence immigrants’ bargaining power. Finally, it is conceivable that citizenship reduces the degree of discrimination
against children with a migration background from the side of the teachers.
22In addition, other channels may play a role. For example, the acquisition of host-country nationality is seen by many
as promoting immigrants’ identification with the host country, which may affect their behavior towards natives. It may
also affect immigrants’ self-esteem, which has been linked to out-group discrimination (Hogg and Abrams [1990]; Rubin
and Hewstone [1998]). Finally, natives may treat immigrants differentially based on their citizenship status, which may
also affect the extend to which immigrants cooperate with natives. We will provide some evidence on the relevance of these
channels in Section III.B.
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the following difference-in-differences regression discontinuity (DID-RD)-type model:23
IG =γ0 + γ1Immigrant + γ2Born Post-Reform+ γ3(Immigrant× Born Post-Reform)
+ θBirth Month + ξFamily + ϑClassroom+ ε,
(3)
In this specification, Immigrant is a binary variable indicating whether a child is a second-generation
immigrant (=1) or a native (=0). The parameter γ1 captures differences between immigrant and native
children born prior to the policy change. Born Post-Reform is a binary assignment variable indicating
whether a child was born in the months just after January 1, 2000 (i.e., it is equal to one for children born
between January and April 2000 and zero for children born between September and December 1999).
The coefficient γ2 measures general differences between children born before and after the citizenship
reform that could cause changes in behavior even in the absence of a policy change. The coefficient of
interest is γ3, which multiplies the interactionMigrant×Born post-reform and thus identifies all immigrant
children born after the policy change. We include a set of Birth Month dummies in all regressions. In
extended specifications, we also include Family characteristics (i.e., maternal age, maternal education,
family structure) and Classroom characteristics (i.e., class size, proportion of students with migration
background, the gender ratio and five victimization measures24).
The coefficient of interest, γ3, represents the reform’s reduced form effect and can be interpreted as the
intention-to-treat (ITT) effect of granting immigrant children citizenship at birth. This ITT effect is a
conservative estimate of the impact of citizenship at birth, since our sample includes pre-policy children
who may have qualified for citizenship at birth through jus sanguinis. Moreover, our sample includes not
only immigrant children who were eligible for birthright citizenship when they were born but also those
who were ineligible for it and were thus unaffected by the reform.25
Throughout this section, we use two samples: a broad sample (BS), in which the treatment group is
made up of all second-generation immigrant children and the control group comprises native children;
and a narrow sample (NS), in which we restrict the treatment group to second-generation immigrant
children with a Turkish background. As mentioned above, children with a Turkish background are by far
the largest minority group among children in Germany, and we use them as a separate treatment group
because they not only share a homogenous cultural background but were also more strongly affected
by the introduction of birthright citizenship than the average immigrant child. Our broad (respectively,
narrow) estimation sample comprises 920 native German children and 360 second-generation immigrant
children (respectively, 158 immigrant children with a Turkish background). To verify whether treatment
was balanced on observables, we present the mean values of key family and classroom characteristics
for immigrant children born before and born after the reform in Appendix Tables A.2 and A.3. The
evidence shows that there are no considerable systematic differences between children born before and
after January 1, 2000. Among the 46 mean difference tests in both samples (see p-values in the last
column of Tables A.2 and A.3), only four mean differences are statistically significantly different from
zero at the 5 percent level. Two of these refer to mother’s age, a difference that is to be expected given
the reform cut-off date. This supports the notion that the German citizenship reform was likely an “as-
23Similar approaches have been used by Lalive and Zweimu¨ller [2009], Dustmann and Scho¨nberg [2012], Scho¨nberg and
Ludsteck [2014], and Danzer and Lavy [2017] within the context of parental leave reforms.
24These victimization measures capture the proportions of students who report having been victims in the past year of
physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft or exclusion.
25This induces classical measurement error which might bias our estimates towards zero. Ideally, we would like to
further restrict our sample to eligible second-generation immigrant children, i.e., those whose parents fulfilled the residency
criterium of eight years when they were born. However, data limitations prevent us from doing so. In particular, although
our survey contains a question on parents’ length of residence in Germany, a sizeable number of immigrant children report
that they “don’t know” their parents’ residency duration. Consequently, restricting the sample on the available information
on parents’ length of residence in Germany would lead to a rather small and likely non-random subsample of immigrant
children and would thus provide us with biased and imprecise estimates.
13
good-as-random” event with no systematic self-selection of particular types of immigrant families across
the cut-off date.
III.C. Behavioral Effects of Birthright Citizenship
We start by comparing the in-group/out-group behavior of second-generation immigrant children born
pre- and post-policy. Figure 6 presents estimates of Equation (2).
Panel (a), which illustrates the results for the broad sample, reveals interesting gender-specific patterns.
Let us first consider the behavior of immigrant boys: Among pre-reform immigrant boys, investments
to immigrants (e 3.15) exceed investments to natives (e 2.75) by e 0.40 or 15%. By contrast, among
post-reform immigrant boys, the in-group/out-group investment gap is a statistically significant 68%,
or e 0.27 lower, i.e., immigrant boys born after the introduction of birthright citizenship are almost
equally inclined to invest toward immigrants and natives. Turning to the behavior of immigrant girls,
it is interesting to observe that the birth date cut-off appears not to matter at all: among pre-reform
immigrant girls, investments to immigrants exceed investments to natives by e 0.42, or 17%, and this
investment gap persists for post-reform immigrant females.
Panel (b) of Figure 6 displays the point estimates for immigrant children with a Turkish background
from our narrow sample. On average, pre-reform Turkish boys send e 3.18 to immigrants and e 2.66
to natives. The difference of e 0.52 corresponds to a (raw) investment gap of nearly 20%. Strikingly,
this gap decreases by a statistically significant e 0.54 for post-reform Turkish boys. Put differently, on
average, the investments of Turkish boys born under jus soli are no longer conditional on whether their
opponents are immigrants or natives. In stark contrast, and consistent with the findings in Panel (a), we
do not find evidence for a reduced in-group/out-group investment gap among Turkish girls.
The main concern with the results presented so far is that they may be confounded by age or season of
birth effects. Thus, in Table 1, we present estimates for Equation (3), with and without the augmented set
of control variables, and both for the broad sample [Columns (1)-(3)] and the narrow sample [Columns
(4)-(6)]. In each Panel (A-C), the estimated coefficients in the first row (γˆ1) capture differences in
in-group/out-group behavior between second-generation immigrant children and native children born
prior to the policy change. The estimated coefficient of interest is γˆ3, which identifies the ITT effect of
citizenship at birth on immigrant children’s in-group versus out-group investments.
Let us first discuss the results of regressions run for boys and girls together (see Panel A). In Column (1),
we estimate Equation (3) for the broad sample and condition only on gender and a full set of birth month
fixed effects. For children born pre-policy, the in-group/out-group investment bias of immigrants exceeds
that of natives by a significant e 0.36. The estimate of -0.103 suggests that the introduction of birthright
citizenship reduced this gap by approximately 29%, although the estimate is not statistically significant
at conventional levels. Columns (2) and (3) show the result to be robust to including controls for family
background and classroom characteristics, respectively. In Columns (4) to (6), we repeat the exercise for
the narrow sample. Since immigrant children with a Turkish background constitute our high-eligibility
sample (i.e., were more strongly affected by the introduction of jus soli than the average immigrant
child), we would expect a more pronounced reform effect. This is confirmed by all three specifications.
For example, the estimate of -0.254 from our preferred specification in Column (6) suggests that the policy
reduced the pre-reform difference between immigrants’ and natives’ in-group/out-group investment gap
(=e 0.50) by 51%. Moreover, in all three specifications based on the narrow sample, the reform effect is
precisely estimated and differs from zero at the 5% significance level.
The remaining two panels of Table 1 break down the estimates by gender. Panel B presents the results
for boys. Consider first the estimated coefficients for the broad sample. Throughout all specifications,
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the reform effect turns out negative, is large in magnitude and is statistically significant at the 5% level.
In our preferred specification [Column (3)], the in-group/out-group investment gap among immigrant
boys born pre-policy exceeds that of native boys by e 0.28, but the introduction of jus soli reduced this
difference by e 0.26, or 93%. In the narrow sample, this effect is even more pronounced and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. For example, the DiD estimates from our preferred specification [Column (6)]
show a pre-reform difference between immigrants’ and natives’ investment bias of e 0.50 and a policy-
induced reduction thereof of e 0.57. This suggests that the reform induced Turkish boys to treat in-
and out-groupers less unequally than their native peers. In Panel C, where we repeat the analysis for
immigrant girls, we find confirmation for the evidence presented above: the reduction in immigrants’
in-group favoritism due to jus soli is an entirely male phenomenon. Specifically, both in the broad and
the narrow sample, and irrespective of the specification, the estimated coefficients for immigrant girls
are small in magnitude—both in absolute terms and relative to estimates of γˆ1—and are statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
Overall, we conclude that the introduction of birthright citizenship caused immigrant boys to almost
completely drop their in-group favoritism. However, it had no measurable impact on the behavior of
immigrant girls. Moreover, we observe above-average reform effects for boys with Turkish background,
our high-eligibility treatment group for whom we have documented above-average in-group favoritism.
III.D. Robustness of the Results
We now test the robustness of our main findings, both in the broad sample (BS) and the narrow sample
(NS). All sensitivity checks, which are reported in Table 2, are conducted for our preferred specification
[see Table 1, Columns (3) and (6), respectively].
For our first robustness check, we recalculate our main dependent variable (IG) by letting SN =
1
2
(S1+S2) and SI =
1
2
(S3+S4) (see our discussion in footnote 12). Columns (BS.1) and (NS.1) in Table
2 show that the estimates based on this alternative outcome measure remain qualitatively unchanged
compared to the benchmark results in Table 1.
In the next robustness check, we use the dichotomous outcome measure Strong Discriminator as
dependent variable [see Columns (BS.2) and (NS.2)].26 The results suggest that the citizenship reform
substantially reduced the share of strong discriminators among immigrant boys, especially in the narrow
sample. For example, in Column (NS.3) of Panel B, we observe that Turkish boys born pre-policy
are 20.4 percentage points more likely to be strong discriminators than their native counterparts, but
the statistically significant reform effect of -20.8 percentage points eliminates this difference completely.
By contrast, both in the broad and in the narrow sample, immigrant girls’ propensity to (strongly)
discriminate between in- and out-groupers was unaffected by the introduction of jus soli.
In our analysis, standard errors are clustered by school type and school location, and there are a total
of 18 clusters. Since reliable inference is a concern when there are few clusters (Donald and Lang [2007];
Cameron et al. [2008]), our third robustness check tests whether the results also hold using wilder cluster
bootstrap t-procedures.27 The estimates in Columns (BS.3) and (NS.3) show that the p-values from
obtained from this bootstrap procedure confirm the levels of statistical significance reported in Table 1.
The citizenship reform we study was ratified and announced in July 1999 but was already openly
discussed in the German parliament during the previous month. Thus, our fourth robustness check
26Recall that we have defined participants as strong discriminators if their in-group investment exceeded their out-group
investment by 25% or more.
27We estimated the wild cluster bootstrap standard errors using 1000 replications under H1, as discussed in Cameron
et al. [2008].
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provides estimations with a narrower ±3-month-window around January 1, 2000.28 This additional
restriction reduces the sample size by approximately 25%. Notwithstanding this, the results in Columns
(BS.4) and (NS.4) show that the coefficients remain largely unchanged compared to the benchmark
estimates in Table 1, although they are less precisely estimated.
Our fifth and final robustness check involves placebo reform regressions. In particular, we shift the
introduction of jus soli backward in time, assuming that it took effect on November 1, 1999. Moreover, we
exclude all children born on or after January 1, 2000, from our placebo sample. The results in Columns
(BS.5) and (NS.5) show that the coefficients on the DiD interaction term are close to zero (or even
positive) and statistically indistinguishable from zero. We conclude that the immigrant-native difference
in intra- versus inter-group cooperation did not converge already among children born pre-policy.
III.E. Possible Explanations for the Reform Effect
In this section, we seek to provide possible explanations for the effect of birthright citizenship. In so
doing, we also address the question of why it is gender-specific.
Educational Integration
The main mechanism we have in mind is about opportunity: citizenship rights improve immigrants’
long-term economic perspective in the host country and may therefore be a catalyst for human capital
investments in immigrant families. In settings where immigrant children are lagging behind their native
peers educationally, this conceivably reduces the social distance between immigrants and natives, with
possible spill-overs into the domain of inter-group cooperation.
Our main outcome measure captures children’s school performance. In the German school system,
the grades vary discretely from 1 (excellent) to 6 (insufficient), with grades below 3 being considered
achievements that exceed average requirements. We calculate a grade point average (GPA) based on
participants’ self-reported grades in the subjects “German” and “Mathematics”. Thus, we create the
indicator Above-Average GPA, which equals one if a participant’s average test score is better than 3, and
zero otherwise.
We first compare the school performance of second-generation immigrant children born pre- and post-
policy. Figure 7 presents estimates of Equation (2) for the dependent variable Above-Average GPA.
We observe gender-specific patterns that mirror our results for intra- versus inter-group cooperation.
Specifically, in the broad sample, 27% of immigrant boys born pre-policy achieved an above-average
GPA, while among those born post-policy this share is a statistically significant 14 percentage points
higher. In the narrow sample, the before-after comparison yields even more-pronounced results: 22%
of Turkish boys born-pre policy report an above-average GPA, while the corresponding share among
those born-post policy is 21 percentage points higher and therefore almost twice as large. For immigrant
girls, by contrast, a similar pattern is not observed: those born post-policy are only marginally, but not
significantly, more likely to achieve above-average test scores than those born pre-policy.
In a second step, we re-run Equation (3) but with the indicator Above-Average GPA as dependent
variable. Table 3 presents the results. Let us consider the estimates from our preferred specifications
[Column (3) for the broad sample, Column (6) for the narrow sample]. The key message one may extract
from Panel A, in which all regressions are run for boys and girls together, is that the citizenship reform
substantially reduced the immigrant-native gap in school performance. For example, in the broad sample
[Column (3)], immigrant children born pre-policy are 9.9 percentage points less likely than their native
28In line with our main specification, we continue to exclude children born in the ±2-week window around the cut-off
date.
16
peers (at an average of 41%) to achieve above-average grades. The statistically significant estimate of
8.9 percentage points suggests that the policy reduced this achievement gap by nearly 90%. As should
be expected, once we restrict our attention to the high-eligibility treatment group of immigrants with a
Turkish background [Column (6)], this effect becomes more pronounced, though somewhat less precisely
estimated. In Panels B and C, in which the analysis is broken down by gender, it is evident that the
reform effect is almost entirely driven by male immigrants. For example, in Column (6) of Panel B, we see
that Turkish boys born pre-policy are 27.3 percentage points less likely than native boys (at an average
of 40%) to achieve above-average grades, but the statistically significant (at the 1% level) estimate of 24
percentage points implies a reduction of this gap by 88%. For immigrant girls (see Panel C), we obtain a
different picture: the pre-reform immigrant-native achievement gap (γˆ1) among girls is much lower and
insignificant, both in the broad sample (3.6 percentage points less than the average of 42% among native
girls) and in the narrow sample (-4.4 percentage points). Loosely put, this implies that immigrant girls
had much less to catch up on (educationally) than immigrant boys. Moreover, the coefficients on the
DID-RD interaction are, though positive, statistically indistinguishable from zero.
We have also investigated an outcome variable intended to capture parents’ involvement in their chil-
dren’s learning. Specifically, we have created the indicator Parental Involvement, which equals one if a
participant reports receiving parental support in homework and is zero for those who do not obtain such
support. Appendix Figure A.4 and Table A.4 present the results. Overall, we find that the introduction
of jus soli led immigrant boys, but not immigrant girls, to receive substantially more learning support
from their parents. For example, based on the broad sample, we find that immigrant boys born pre-policy
are 33.8 percentage points less likely than their native peers (at an average of 77%) to have parents who
support their learning, but for those born post-policy, the gap is a statistically significant 21.3 percentage
points, or 63% smaller. As before, this effect is more pronounced in the narrow sample. Thus, the reform
appears to have induced parents of immigrant boys to provide them with similar support as boys in
native families.
Other potential channels
Host Country Identification. The introduction of birthright citizenship could have affected immigrant
children’s sense of identification with Germany. To that end, we exploit the following question in our
survey: How much do you feel like a German (Very much, rather much, in some sense, not much, not
at all)? Our outcome measure Identification with Germany equals one for participants who choose the
answer categories “very much” or “rather much”, and is zero otherwise. We re-run Equations (2) and
(3) but with the indicator Identification with Germany as the dependent variable. Appendix Figure
A.5 and Table A.5 report the results, which can be summarized in brief: second-generation immigrant
children born post-policy are not more likely to self-identify with Germany than those born pre-policy.
This result holds both in the broad and in the narrow sample, and it applies equally to male and female
immigrants. We therefore consider a direct social identity change as an unlikely channel for the reform
effect on in-group versus out-group behavior. We also observe that immigrant girls show a weaker sense
of host country identification than immigrant boys, a point we shall return to at the end of the section.
Differential Treatment by Natives. The increase in out-group cooperation due to jus soli could be inter-
preted as a rational response by immigrant children if their native peers treat them differentially based
on their citizenship status. Recall that in our design, opponent types k ∈ {3, 4} refer to immigrants as
a whole (i.e., boys and girls with foreign parents), while opponent types k ∈ {5, 6} refer to the subset of
naturalized immigrants (i.e., naturalized boys and girls with foreign parents). In Appendix Figure A.6,
we analyze whether this distinction matters for the behavior of native children. In brief, the evidence
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suggests that native children do not systematically treat immigrants differently based on their citizenship
status. For example, in Panel (a), in which we illustrate the investment choices of native children as
first-movers, we observe a small bias in favor of naturalized immigrants, but the investment gap to immi-
grants as a whole hardly exceeds 1%. In Panel (b), where we look at the back transfers of native children
as second-movers, the citizenship status of immigrant children appears not to matter at all. Finally, no
gender-specific patterns can be observed. Thus, based on these findings, we conclude that differential
treatment by natives is unlikely to be a main channel for the reform effect and its gender-specific nature.
Immigrant Girls: What Explains Their Low Out-Group Cooperation and the Lack of a
Reform Effect?
Let us interpret the findings to this point. For immigrant boys, there is a strong elasticity between the
educational gap separating them from their native peers and in-group/out-group cooperation: Before the
citizenship reform took effect, they were lagging behind their native peers educationally and strongly
disfavored them, compared to other immigrants, in the investment game. The introduction of jus soli,
in turn, saw a substantial reduction in in-group favoritism among immigrant boys together with a near-
closure of the achievement gap between them and their native peers. Thus, one interpretation is that
the immigrant-native gap in education is an important factor in immigrant boys’ in-group/out-group
behavior and a likely channel for changes thereof in the aftermath of the citizenship reform.
This explanation, however, leaves us with a puzzle regarding immigrant girls’ decisions to cooperate. In
particular, in stark contrast to immigrant boys, immigrant girls were not lagging much behind their native
peers educationally before the citizenship reform took effect. Despite this, we observe a strong degree
of in-group favoritism among immigrant girls born pre-policy. Moreover, for them, the introduction of
jus soli had no discernible effect on their in-group/out-group behavior, nor did it foster their educational
integration. Overall, this suggests that education and/or educational integration does not exert the
same influence on immigrant girls as on immigrant boys. This raises an important question for future
research: What explains immigrant girls’ low out-group cooperation and the lack of an effect of increased
opportunities?
Although our study was not set up to address this unanticipated puzzle, we take some first steps to
explore it. Our hypothesis is that cultural factors, ones that were unaffected by the reform, play an im-
portant role in immigrant girls’ in-group/out-group behavior. A consistent finding in many psychological
and sociological studies of immigrant families is that parents adopt different socialization strategies for
their daughters and their sons (for an insightful review, see Sua´rez-Orozco and Qin [2006]). In particular,
across many immigrant groups, girls are socialized to be “keepers of the culture” and often face strict
parental restrictions on extra-household activities that boys are free to choose (e.g., spending time with
friends, attending parties, participating in after-school programs). This double standard in parental con-
trol has been found to be particularly strong when immigrant parents perceive the host society as posing
a threat to the values of their native culture (Dion and Dion [2001]).
The existing literature suggests two implications of this gender-specific socialization pattern that may
be relevant in our context. First, it shapes the process of ethnic self-identification. For example, in the
United States, immigrant girls are more likely than immigrant boys to ethnically self-identify with their
parents’ immigrant origins. Immigrant boys, by contrast, are more likely to choose a national identity
(Qin-Hilliard [2003]; Yip and Fuligni [2002]), potentially independently from their parents. This, in turn,
may influence the extent to which immigrant boys and girls differentiate between in-group and out-group
children. Second, due to the double standard in parental control, immigrant girls are more likely than
immigrant boys to face a high level of parent-child conflict and, consequently, to have lower self-esteem
(Rumbaut [1994]). According to the “self-esteem hypothesis” in the psychological theory of social identity
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(Hogg and Abrams [1990]; Rubin and Hewstone [1998]), immigrant girls might restore a more positive
self-concept through out-group discrimination.
Our survey allows us to descriptively examine whether there are gender differences in immigrants’ sense
of identification with the host country and their self-esteem. Appendix Figure A.7 presents the results.
In Panel (a), we plot the proportions of second-generation immigrants reporting that they identify with
Germany, separately for girls and boys.29 In the broad sample, we detect no noticeable gender differences:
roughly one-third of all immigrant boys and girls self-identify with their host nation. However, once we
restrict our attention to Turkish immigrants in the narrow sample, we observe that roughly 30 percent
of all Turkish boys self-identify with Germany, while the corresponding share among immigrant girls is
one-third lower. Unconditional OLS regressions reveal this difference to be statistically significant at the
5% level. This finding ties in well with the above discussion: Turkish immigrants are predominantly
Muslim, and evidence suggests that their identification with the Islamic culture is strong—not just in
Germany but also in other major European destinations of Turkish migration, such as France and the
Netherlands (Ersanilli and Koopmans [2009]). As argued above, such an environment typically reinforces
differential socialization pressures on immigrant girls and boys.
In Panel (b), we plot gender-specific proportions of second-generation immigrants reporting a low level
of self-esteem.30 In both the broad and the narrow sample, roughly one-tenth of all immigrant boys
report a low level of self-esteem, while the corresponding share among immigrant girls is twice as a large.
Unconditional OLS regressions show the gender differences to be statistically significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the results hold for several alternative measures of self-esteem.31 Taken as whole, we view this
as suggestive evidence that immigrant boys show better psychological adaption than immigrant girls, a
finding also reached in a recent cross-country study of offspring of Turkish and Vietnamese immigrants
(Berry et al. [2006]). To the extent that low self-esteem can reinforce negativity towards out-groups,
we also view it as a possible explanation for the strong and persistent in-group favoritism shown by
immigrant girls.
We consider this evidence as suggestive but in no way conclusive. There other plausible explanations for
immigrant girls’ low out-group cooperation. Perhaps most importantly, we cannot rule out the possibility
that perceived discrimination by native peers is a salient factor in immigrant girls’ out-group behavior.
This seems important, not least because immigrant girls and immigrant boys often differ in external
markers (e.g., wearing of headscarves) that may give rise to subtle and difficult-to-measure forms of
discrimination. We plan to address these issues in future research.
IV. Conclusions
Immigration has put many developed countries on a new demographic path. Immigrant children, in
particular, make up a large and growing proportion of youth populations around the Western world. As
a result, many scholars and policy makers argue that success in integrating immigrant children will be a
crucial nation-building tool for years to come. Our starting point was the recognition that integration has
several relevant dimensions. In particular, if we are to get a glimpse of the future face of Western societies,
it is not just important to understand how today’s immigrant children fare in the education system—we
also need to know how children with and without migration backgrounds interact and whether integration
policies can help overcome in-group/out-group phenomena and bring about cooperation between individ-
29Here, we once more exploit the variable Identification with Germany, which we have described above.
30In our survey, we asked participants: To what extent does the following statement apply to you [on a discrete scale from
1 (does not apply at all) to 6 (applies completely)]: “I have a positive attitude towards myself”. Our outcome measure Low
Self-Esteem equals one for participants who place themselves in the bottom half of the six-point scale, and zero otherwise.
31The findings for these alternative self-esteem measures are available upon request.
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uals with diverse backgrounds and perspectives. We have addressed this issue by combining a natural
experiment—the introduction of birthright citizenship in Germany—with an lab-in-the-field experiment
based on the investment game with nearly 4,500 adolescents in their final year of compulsory schooling.
We find evidence for an asymmetric pattern of cooperation among Germany’s youth: native children are
in almost equal measure willing to cooperate with native and immigrant interaction partners. Immigrant
children, by contrast, have a high propensity to cooperate with other immigrants but a low willingness
to cooperate with their native peers. This suggests a need to reconsider some of the conventional wisdom
about migrant integration. Discrimination against immigrants is an issue that figures prominently in
many debates. Although we are not questioning the importance of this issue, it largely ignores the
cleavages we have identified, i.e., that immigrants and natives may not be able to resolve social dilemmas
because immigrant’s cooperative decision making is in-group bounded and parochial.
In connecting the experiment to the introduction of birthright citizenship, we have shown that these
cleavages are not carved in stone. In particular, immigrant boys who, through the reform, received the
same legal status as their native counterparts and as a result have caught up with them in terms of
educational achievement appear to have extended their willingness to cooperate to their native peers.
Thus, an important conclusion of our results is that governments can modify and nurture prosocial
behavior, in our case resulting in more cooperation between immigrant males and native youth and,
consequently, higher levels of efficiency in the interaction between social groups.
That said, the results also point to an important open challenge for policy makers: we have found
that immigrant girls strongly discriminate in favor of immigrants and against natives in the investment
game; yet, the positive reform effects we have uncovered—both in terms of out-group cooperation and
education—are an entirely male phenomenon, i.e., the reform appears to have done little for the social
integration of immigrant girls. This suggests that integration interventions are unlikely to offer “one fits
all” solutions; those targeted at immigrant children may need to be gender-specific and take into account
cultural factors different socialization pressures that immigrant girls and boys experience in the process
of integration.
One issue we have not touched upon so far is whether our findings are generalizable to non-market
interactions between immigrants and natives outside our laboratory setting. One interesting testing
ground in this respect could be occupational settings. The cohorts born around January 1, 2000, will
soon enter the labor market, where they will very likely encounter multicultural work environments. In
such environments, immigrants and natives will need to cooperate, inter alia, as employees. With a
suitably designed study, it would be feasible to analyze the scope for workplace cooperation between
immigrants and natives and the long-run impact of birthright citizenship along this dimension. Thus,
an important agenda for future research remains. Finally, our evidence comes from a single country of
immigration, albeit the world’s second-largest, and we prefer to avoid conjectures about external validity
in this respect. Nonetheless, we believe that the results in this paper are useful for thinking about how
widening the opportunities for disadvantaged groups may crowd-in social behavior that benefits society
as a whole.
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Figure 6: Trust Discrimination Among Immigrants Born Around January 1, 2000
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Sample comprises all immigrant children born between September
1999 and April 2000. ±2-week donut around the cut-off. Standard errors clustered by school type and
school location. In square brackets, we report mean investments to immigrants (first entry) and mean
investments to natives (second entry). Whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 7: Educational Attainment Among Immigrants Born Around January 1, 2000
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Sample comprises all immigrant children born between September
1999 and April 2000. ±2-week donut around the cut-off. Standard errors clustered by school type and
school location. Whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Table 1
Behavioral Effects of Birthright Citizenship, DID-RD Analysis for the Broad and Narrow Sample
Dependent Variable: In-Group/Out-Group Investment Gap
Broad Sample Narrow Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.360*** 0.343*** 0.337*** 0.505*** 0.494*** 0.497***
(0.084) (0.067) (0.054) (0.154) (0.138) (0.126)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.103 -0.099 -0.106 -0.245** -0.244** -0.254**
(0.078) (0.073) (0.071) (0.085) (0.086) (0.089)
Observations 1,280 1,280 1,280 1,078 1,078 1,078
R-squared 0.038 0.048 0.056 0.045 0.054 0.060
Panel B: Boys
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.278** 0.314*** 0.281** 0.402** 0.460*** 0.459***
(0.109) (0.100) (0.112) (0.157) (0.153) (0.157)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.261** -0.284** -0.260** -0.558*** -0.571*** -0.565***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.094) (0.157) (0.146) (0.150)
Observations 618 618 618 529 529 529
R-squared 0.017 0.049 0.062 0.026 0.056 0.070
Panel C: Girls
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.434*** 0.427*** 0.418*** 0.589*** 0.610*** 0.586***
(0.083) (0.085) (0.066) (0.176) (0.176) (0.156)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) 0.045 0.037 0.034 0.0128 -0.060 -0.056
(0.085) (0.095) (0.090) (0.143) (0.170) (0.172)
Observations 662 662 662 549 549 549
R-squared 0.086 0.107 0.118 0.104 0.134 0.142
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (3). Standard errors clustered by school type and school location and reported in
parentheses; p-values reported in square brackets. All specifications in Panel A control for gender. Family characteristics
include mother’s age, dummy variables for mother’s education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure
(five groups) . Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students with migration background, the gender
ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having been victims in the past year
of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft or exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Table 2
Behavioral Effects of Birthright Citizenship, DID-RD Robustness Checks for the Broad and Narrow Sample
Dependent Variable: In-Group/Out-Group Investment Gap
Alternative IG Strong discriminator t-wild cluster 3-month window Placebo reform
(BS.1) (NS.1) (BS.2) (NS.2) (BS.3) (NS.3) (BS.4) (NS.4) (BS.5) (NS.5)
Panel A: All
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.300*** 0.459*** 0.135*** 0.173** 0.337*** 0.497*** 0.330*** 0.490*** 0.335** 0.430**
(0.059) (0.130) (0.043) (0.079) [0.000] [0.000] (0.085) (0.154) (0.121) (0.189)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.112 -0.216** -0.035 -0.058 -0.106 -0.254** -0.069 -0.210* 0.048 0.014
(0.082) (0.077) (0.062) (0.085) [0.263] [0.020] (0.095) (0.113) (0.158) (0.149)
Observations 1,280 1,078 1,280 1,078 1,280 1,078 961 800 557 473
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.052 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.112 0.13
Panel B: Boys
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.262* 0.381** 0.136* 0.204** 0.281** 0.459** 0.226 0.505** 0.356** 0.420
(0.130) (0.172) (0.069) (0.089) [0.040] [0.020] (0.146) (0.238) (0.161) (0.257)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.282** -0.508** -0.086 -0.208** -0.260** -0.565** -0.214 -0.612** -0.035 -0.002
(0.125) (0.211) (0.074) (0.082) [0.040] [0.020] (0.146) (0.222) (0.201) (0.270)
Observations 618 529 618 529 618 529 461 390 265 232
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.15
Panel C: Girls
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.370*** 0.575*** 0.139*** 0.170* 0.418*** 0.586*** 0.454*** 0.547*** 0.352** 0.476**
(0.057) (0.176) (0.036) (0.080) [0.000] [0.000] (0.085) (0.154) (0.149) (0.196)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) 0.029 -0.020 0.010 0.038 0.034 -0.056 0.027 0.007 0.114 0.010
(0.108) (0.186) (0.064) (0.081) [0.667] [0.889] (0.105) (0.161) (0.171) (0.126)
Observations 662 549 662 549 662 549 500 410 292 241
R-squared 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.18
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (3). Standard errors clustered by school type and school location are reported in parentheses. For the specifications based on t-wild
cluster bootstrap procedures, we report p-values in square brackets. All specifications in Panel A control for gender. Family characteristics include mother’s age, dummy
variables for mother’s education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure (five groups) . Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students
with migration background, the gender ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having been victims in the past year of physical
abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft or exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Table 3
Educational Effects of Birthright Citizenship, DID-RD Analysis for the Broad and Narrow Sample
Dependent Variable: Above-Average GPA
Broad Sample Narrow Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.057* -0.058** -0.099** -0.101*** -0.079 -0.123**
(0.029) (0.024) (0.040) (0.032) (0.049) (0.054)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) 0.074** 0.076** 0.089** 0.115** 0.111* 0.128*
(0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.054) (0.054) (0.062)
Observations 1,256 1,256 1,256 1,057 1,057 1,057
R-squared 0.009 0.025 0.045 0.010 0.026 0.044
Panel B: Boys
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.136*** -0.148*** -0.199*** -0.188*** -0.208*** -0.273***
(0.044) (0.038) (0.056) (0.058) (0.053) (0.063)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.248*** 0.244*** 0.240***
(0.050) (0.058) (0.060) (0.046) (0.045) (0.052)
Observations 604 604 604 517 517 517
R-squared 0.014 0.035 0.052 0.017 0.036 0.054
Panel C: Girls
Immigrant (γˆ1) 0.002 0.008 -0.036 -0.037 0.003 -0.044
(0.046) (0.050) (0.067) (0.055) (0.076) (0.079)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.016 -0.014 0.014 0.008 0.019 0.056
(0.052) (0.054) (0.048) (0.108) (0.106) (0.106)
Observations 652 652 652 540 540 540
R-squared 0.005 0.029 0.067 0.007 0.035 0.065
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (3). Standard errors clustered by school type and school location and reported
in parentheses. All specifications in Panel A control for gender. Family characteristics include mother’s age, dummy
variables for mother’s education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure (five groups) . Class charac-
teristics include class size, proportion of students with migration background, the gender ratio and five victimization
measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having been victims in the past year of physical abuse, verbal
abuse, lies, theft or exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
2.
2
2.
3
2.
4
2.
5
2.
6
2.
7
2.
8
2.
9
3
3.
1
3.
2
M
ea
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 U
nd
er
ta
ke
n
Native Immigrant
Migration Background of the Sender
(a) All
2.
2
2.
3
2.
4
2.
5
2.
6
2.
7
2.
8
2.
9
3
3.
1
3.
2
M
ea
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 U
nd
er
ta
ke
n
Native Immigrant
Migration Background of the Sender
(b) Boys
2.
2
2.
3
2.
4
2.
5
2.
6
2.
7
2.
8
2.
9
3
3.
1
3.
2
M
ea
n 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 U
nd
er
ta
ke
n
Native Immigrant
Migration Background of the Sender
(c) Girls
Native Boy Native Girl
Immigrant Boy Immigrant Girl
Receiver:
Figure A.1: First-Mover Investment Decisions of Native and Immigrant Children by Migration Back-
ground and Gender of Second-Movers
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Figure A.2: First-Mover Investment Decisions of Mixed-
Background Children by Migration Background of Second-
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Figure A.4: Parental Educational Involvement Among Immigrants Born Around Jan-
uary 1, 2000
Notes: Sample comprises all immigrant children born between September 1999 and April 2000. ±2-week
donut around the cut-off. Standard errors clustered by school type and school location. Whiskers indicate
the 95% confidence interval.
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Dependent Variable: Identification with Germany
Figure A.5: Identification with Germany Among Immigrants Born Around January 1,
2000
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Sample comprises all immigrant children born between September
1999 and April 2000. ±2-week donut around the cut-off. Standard errors clustered by school type and
school location. Whiskers indicate the 95% confidence interval.
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Table A.1
Descriptive Statistics by Migration Background, Full Sample
Natives Immigrants
Gender and Family Structure
Female 0.536 0.500
Lives with both parents 0.547 0.738
Lives with one parent 0.381 0.172
Lives with: other 0.027 0.024
Lives with: missing 0.044 0.066
Mother’s Age 46.124 44.102
Mother’s Education
None or Low (“Hauptschule”) 0.248 0.324
Intermediate (“Realschule”) 0.412 0.173
High (“Abitur”) or University 0.206 0.169
Other, Unknown or Missing 0.134 0.334
Religious Affiliation
Catholic 0.141 0.163
Protestant 0.525 0.085
Islamic 0.018 0.590
None, Other, Missing 0.316 0.162
Language Spoken at Home
Mostly German 0.976 0.289
Mostly Foreign Language 0.011 0.690
Missing 0.013 0.021
Mother’s Country/Region of Birth
Turkey / 0.376
Middle East & Africa / 0.139
Post-Soviet Country / 0.123
Balkan Country / 0.112
Eastern Europe / 0.106
Other Country / 0.144
Observations 2,201 1,218
Notes: “Natives” are children whose parents are both German-born. “Immigrants” are
children whose parents are both foreign-born.
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Table A.2
Descriptive Statistics for the Broad Sample
Natives Immigrants Immigrants
born
pre-reform
Immigrants
born
post-reform
p-value
Gender and Family Structure
Female .499 .564 .612 .521 .004
Lives with both Parents .570 .808 .824 .795 .419
Lives with Mother .321 .103 .100 .105 .796
Lives with Father .048 .022 .012 .032 .229
Lives with: Other .014 .022 .029 .016 .324
Lives with: Missing .048 .044 .035 .053 .368
Mother’s Age 46.057 44.542 45.424 43.753 .009
Mothers’ Education
None .010 .172 .165 .179 .566
Low .198 .144 .159 .132 .456
Intermediate .432 .197 .165 .226 .146
High .149 .092 .088 .095 .828
University .077 .050 .059 .042 .426
Other .005 .025 .041 .011 .148
Unknown .100 .292 .288 .295 .891
Missing .029 .028 .035 .021 .359
Class Characteristics
Class Size 19.186 17.903 17.924 17.884 .936
Share Immigrants .337 .569 .562 .574 .695
Share Males .489 .500 .503 .498 .643
Share Insulted .724 .702 .696 .708 .272
Share Ignored .503 .473 .460 .485 .223
Share Hurt .098 .116 .119 .114 .470
Share Lied .827 .738 .716 .759 .052
Share Stolen .217 .242 .239 .245 .632
Observations 920 360 170 190
Notes: Sample restricted to an 8-month window centered around the reform’s cut-off date and excluding a 4-
week window around the reform’s cut-off date. “Natives” comprises children whose parents are both German-
born. “Immigrants” (1) refers to children who are German-born but whose parents are both foreign-born (second
generation immigrants). “Pre-reform” and “Post-reform” refer to “Immigrants” who are either born before (in
1999) or after (in 2000) the reform’s cut-off date. P-values refer to the respective differences between the groups.
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Table A.3
Descriptive Statistics for the Narrow Sample
Natives Immigrants Immigrants
born
pre-reform
Immigrants
born
post-reform
p-value
Gender and Family Structure
Female .499 .57 .59 .55 .49
Lives with both Parents .57 .829 .808 .85 .251
Lives with Mother .321 .076 .103 .05 .024
Lives with Father .048 .013 .013 .013 .987
Lives with: Other .014 .025 .026 .025 .97
Lives with: Missing .048 .057 .051 .063 .74
Mother’s Age 46.057 44.335 45.654 43.05 .055
Mothers’ Education
None .01 .266 .231 .3 .147
Low .198 .19 .205 .175 .624
Intermediate .432 .139 .115 .163 .327
High .149 .044 .051 .038 .684
University .077 .019 .013 .025 .625
Other .005 .038 .051 .025 .55
Unknown .1 .285 .295 .275 .811
Missing .029 .019 .038 0 .022
Class Characteristics
Class Size 19.186 17.411 17.705 17.125 .437
Share Immigrants .337 .591 .59 .592 .959
Share Males .489 .494 .5 .49 .559
Share Insulted .724 .694 .697 .69 .601
Share Ignored .503 .447 .443 .451 .766
Share Hurt .098 .107 .11 .104 .502
Share Lied .827 .722 .691 .752 .075
Share Stolen .217 .243 .237 .25 .628
Observations 920 158 78 80
Notes: Sample restricted to an 8-month window centered around the reform’s cut-off date and excluding a 4-week
window around the reform’s cut-off date. “Natives” comprises children whose parents are both German-born.
“Immigrants” (1) refers to children who are German-born but whose parents are both foreign-born, with at least
one parent being of Turkish origin. “Pre-reform” and “Post-reform” refer to “Immigrants” who are either born
before (in 1999) or after (in 2000) the reform’s cut-off date. P-values refer to the respective differences between the
groups.
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Table A.4
Effects on Parental Educational Involvement, DID-RD Analysis for the Broad and Narrow Sample
Dependent Variable: Identification with Germany
Broad Sample Narrow Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.228*** -0.202*** -0.194*** -0.198** -0.144* -0.147
(0.043) (0.050) (0.053) (0.070) (0.080) (0.086)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) 0.029 0.025 0.033 -0.013 0.003 0.007
(0.070) (0.069) (0.069) (0.120) (0.121) (0.122)
Observations 1,262 1,262 1,262 1,060 1,060 1,060
R-squared 0.055 0.101 0.107 0.034 0.077 0.084
Panel B: Boys
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.386*** -0.352*** -0.338*** -0.346*** -0.321*** -0.305***
(0.075) (0.072) (0.075) (0.059) (0.054) (0.074)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) 0.211** 0.197** 0.213** 0.240** 0.254*** 0.245***
(0.094) (0.083) (0.081) (0.089) (0.070) (0.075)
Observations 610 610 610 521 521 521
R-squared 0.081 0.124 0.150 0.041 0.074 0.095
Panel C: Girls
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.118** -0.088 -0.096* -0.092 -0.016 -0.029
(0.049) (0.057) (0.050) (0.072) (0.085) (0.085)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.106 -0.114 -0.109 -0.224 -0.217 -0.219
(0.078) (0.076) (0.073) (0.146) (0.155) (0.153)
Observations 652 652 652 539 539 539
R-squared 0.055 0.115 0.125 0.057 0.131 0.140
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Pre-reform difference refers to the conditional pre-reform difference in trust
discrimination between treatment and control group. Standard errors clustered by school type and school location and
reported in parentheses; p-values reported in square brackets. All specifications in Panel A control for gender. Family
characteristics include mothers’ age, dummy variables for mothers’ education (eight groups) and dummy variables
for family structure (five groups) . Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students with migration
background, the gender ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having been
victims in the past year of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft or exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at
the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Table A.5
Effects on Identification with Germany, DID-RD Analysis for the Broad and Narrow Sample
Dependent Variable: Identification with Germany
Broad Sample Narrow Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.492*** -0.472*** -0.451*** -0.570*** -0.544*** -0.538***
(0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.063) (0.057) (0.063)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.0309 -0.0288 -0.0256 -0.0287 -0.0169 -0.0199
(0.0578) (0.0597) (0.0562) (0.0713) (0.0738) (0.0707)
Observations 1,269 1,269 1,269 1,067 1,067 1,067
R-squared 0.271 0.283 0.292 0.267 0.278 0.285
Panel B: Boys
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.461*** -0.444*** -0.422*** -0.543*** -0.518*** -0.506***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.062) (0.078) (0.085) (0.086)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.074 -0.069 -0.048 0.015 0.035 0.042
(0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.102) (0.108) (0.102)
Observations 612 612 612 523 523 523
R-squared 0.275 0.298 0.318 0.225 0.252 0.275
Panel C: Girls
Immigrant (γˆ1) -0.508*** -0.472*** -0.452*** -0.593*** -0.550*** -0.550***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.053) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066)
Born post-reform*Immigrant (γˆ3) -0.010 -0.011 -0.024 -0.069 -0.078 -0.084
(0.082) (0.085) (0.081) (0.072) (0.082) (0.075)
Observations 657 657 657 544 544 544
R-squared 0.290 0.313 0.320 0.325 0.346 0.352
Month of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Family Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Characteristics Yes Yes
Notes: OLS estimates of Equation (2). Standard errors clustered by school type and school location and reported in
parentheses; p-values reported in square brackets. All specifications in Panel A control for gender. Family characteristics
include mother’s age, dummy variables for mother’s education (eight groups) and dummy variables for family structure
(five groups). Class characteristics include class size, proportion of students with migration background, the gender
ratio and five victimization measures (i.e., the proportion of students who report having been victims in the past year
of physical abuse, verbal abuse, lies, theft or exclusion). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
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Appendix B: Experimental Setup and Design
B.1. Classroom Setup
Figure B.1: An Example of a Classroom Setup
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B.2. Translation of Instructions
Participation in this game is voluntary!
Thank you very much for participating. From now on, please do not speak with anyone else apart from
us about the game. Unfortunately, if you break this rule, we will have to exclude you from the game.
The objective of this game is to examine how people make decisions. There are no “right” or “wrong”
decisions in the game and our aim is not to test your knowledge. Make your decisions exactly as you
wish. During this game, you will be earning real money. We guarantee that you will receive a cash
payout within two weeks. You will receive your money in an envelope marked with your ID number, so
please make sure you keep your ID number in a safe place! These envelopes will be passed out by one of
your teachers or can be collected from the secretarys office.
The amount of money you earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. We
will now describe the rules in detail. It is therefore especially important that you listen very carefully.
There are no “right” or “wrong” decisions in this game. You should make your decisions based on your
own personal deliberations. Your decisions will remain anonymous, which means that no one else will
know what you decide.
If you have any questions after reading these instructions, please raise your hand. Someone will then
come over to you and answer your questions in private (i.e., quietly).
Process:
There are two roles in this game: sender and responder.
The game starts as follows: Each sender and each responder receives 5 euros. The sender must decide
how much of the 5 euros he/she wishes to give to the responder.
The amount the sender gives to “his/her” responder will then be tripled. In other words, the responder
receives precisely three times the amount the sender has given him/her.
Next, it is the responders turn. He/she now has three times the amount the sender has given him/her
plus his/her own 5 euros. The responder must now decide how much of this money he/she would like to
return to his/her sender. Please note: The sum the responder returns to the sender is not tripled.
Payment:
At the end of the game, the sender receives the sum that he/she kept plus the sum that the responder
returned to him/her.
Payment to sender = 5 euros - sum sent + sum returned (by responder)
The responder receives the sum he/she was given by the sender (times 3), minus the sum he/she returned
to the sender.
Payment to responder = 5 euros + 3 x sum sent (by sender) - sum returned
Decisions:
You will be required to make one decision in the role of sender and one in the role of responder. You can
also choose between different categories of senders and responders; you obviously do not have to treat
these groups differently, however. These categories are described on the decision sheet. You can, for
instance, choose whether you send or return money to a boy or a girl. It is your decision, there is no
“right” or “wrong”.
Calculating your payment:
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Some of the following points will be easier to understand once you have seen the decision sheets. We will
now go through the points and then look at the decision sheets together. If you still have questions after
that, we will be happy come back to these points.
Once the game has been carried out in several schools, the following will happen:
1. Two students from different schools will be randomly paired; you will therefore not know “your”
sender or “your” responder personally; however, he or she will be around the same age as you and
will also go to school in North Rhine-Westphalia.
2. Who is to play the role of the sender and who the role of the responder will also be randomly
decided.
3. Next, we identify the category (see decision sheet) that the sender and responder are each from.
This information is extracted from the questionnaire you completed. The sender can be a girl and
the responder a boy, for instance.
4. Next, the senders decision is implemented based on the actual category of the responder.
5. Finally, the responders decision is implemented based on the actual category of the sender and the
actual amount received from their sender.
6. We now know how much the sender has sent and how much the responder has returned. Based on
this, we can calculate the payment to both the sender and the responder. This money is then placed
in the appropriate envelopes marked with the corresponding sender and responder ID numbers and
taken to the schools.
7. At the end, you will be able to collect the envelope containing your payment at your school.
Now look at the decision sheets. This will help you to better understand some of the points described
above. Think carefully about the decisions you wish to make. You have plenty of time! If you have any
questions, please raise your hand. Someone will then come over to you and answer your questions in
private (i.e., quietly).
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B.3. Experimental Design: Decision Sheets
ID: 
" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "
Please KEEP your ID!!!!!
ID: 
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Sender
You are the sender and you have 5 EURO. Which amount would you like to send
to the receiver (max. 5 EURO)? Please check one box in each column 1-6.
The receiver is...
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 COLUMN 6
... a boy
with German
parents
... a girl
with German
parents
... a boy with
foreign parents
... a girl with
foreign parents
... a boy with
foreign parents
who possesses
German citi-
zenship
... a girl with
foreign parents
who possesses
German citi-
zenship
 0 EURO  0 EURO  0 EURO  0 EURO  0 EURO  0 EURO
 0.5 EURO  0.5 EURO  0.5 EURO  0.5 EURO  0.5 EURO  0.5 EURO
 1 EURO  1 EURO  1 EURO  1 EURO  1 EURO  1 EURO
 1.5 EURO  1.5 EURO  1.5 EURO  1.5 EURO  1.5 EURO  1.5 EURO
 2 EURO  2 EURO  2 EURO  2 EURO  2 EURO  2 EURO
 2.5 EURO  2.5 EURO  2.5 EURO  2.5 EURO  2.5 EURO  2.5 EURO
 3 EURO  3 EURO  3 EURO  3 EURO  3 EURO  3 EURO
 3.5 EURO  3.5 EURO  3.5 EURO  3.5 EURO  3.5 EURO  3.5 EURO
 4 EURO  4 EURO  4 EURO  4 EURO  4 EURO  4 EURO
 4.5 EURO  4.5 EURO  4.5 EURO  4.5 EURO  4.5 EURO  4.5 EURO
 5 EURO  5 EURO  5 EURO  5 EURO  5 EURO  5 EURO
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How much do you think“your”receiver will send back to you? Consider that he or
she now has 5 EURO plus three times the amount that you sent (max. 20
EURO). Recall: We tripled the amount you sent. Please fill in columns 1-6 and
use one decimal place at most (10-cent steps).
The receiver is...
COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 COLUMN 5 COLUMN 6
... a boy
with German
parents
... a girl
with German
parents
... a boy with
foreign parents
... a girl with
foreign parents
... a boy with
foreign parents
who possesses
German citi-
zenship
... a girl with
foreign parents
who possesses
German citi-
zenship
EURO EURO EURO EURO EURO EURO
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Receiver 1
You are the receiver. The sender is a boy with German parents. How much do
you want to send back to him? Please fill in an amount for each possible case (at
most one decimal place = 10-cent steps.)
Assume the sender
has sent you the fol-
lowing amount:
The sender still
has:
You have: Which amount
do you want to
send back:
Potential amount
to send back:
0 EURO 5 EURO 5 EURO EURO (0 to 5 EURO)
0.5 EURO 4.5 EURO 6.5 EURO EURO (0 to 6.5 EURO)
1 EURO 4 EURO 8 EURO EURO (0 to 8 EURO)
1.5 EURO 3.5 EURO 9.5 EURO EURO (0 to 9.5 EURO)
2 EURO 3 EURO 11 EURO EURO (0 to 11 EURO)
2.5 EURO 2.5 EURO 12.5 EURO EURO (0 to 12.5 EURO)
3 EURO 2 EURO 14 EURO EURO (0 to 14 EURO)
3.5 EURO 1.5 EURO 15.5 EURO EURO (0 to 15.5 EURO)
4 EURO 1 EURO 17 EURO EURO (0 to 17 EURO)
4.5 EURO 0.5 EURO 18.5 EURO EURO (0 to 18.5 EURO)
5 EURO 0 EURO 20 EURO EURO (0 to 20 EURO)
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Receiver 2
You are the receiver. The sender is a girl with German parents. How much do
you want to send back to her? Please fill in an amount for each possible case (at
most one decimal place = 10-cent steps.)
Assume the sender
has sent you the fol-
lowing amount:
The sender still
has:
You have: Which amount
do you want to
send back:
Potential amount
to send back:
0 EURO 5 EURO 5 EURO EURO (0 to 5 EURO)
0.5 EURO 4.5 EURO 6.5 EURO EURO (0 to 6.5 EURO)
1 EURO 4 EURO 8 EURO EURO (0 to 8 EURO)
1.5 EURO 3.5 EURO 9.5 EURO EURO (0 to 9.5 EURO)
2 EURO 3 EURO 11 EURO EURO (0 to 11 EURO)
2.5 EURO 2.5 EURO 12.5 EURO EURO (0 to 12.5 EURO)
3 EURO 2 EURO 14 EURO EURO (0 to 14 EURO)
3.5 EURO 1.5 EURO 15.5 EURO EURO (0 to 15.5 EURO)
4 EURO 1 EURO 17 EURO EURO (0 to 17 EURO)
4.5 EURO 0.5 EURO 18.5 EURO EURO (0 to 18.5 EURO)
5 EURO 0 EURO 20 EURO EURO (0 to 20 EURO)
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Receiver 3
You are the receiver. The sender is a boy with foreign parents. How much do you
want to send back to him? Please fill in an amount for each possible case (at most
one decimal place = 10-cent steps.)
Assume the sender
has sent you the fol-
lowing amount:
The sender still
has:
You have: Which amount
do you want to
send back:
Potential amount
to send back:
0 EURO 5 EURO 5 EURO EURO (0 to 5 EURO)
0.5 EURO 4.5 EURO 6.5 EURO EURO (0 to 6.5 EURO)
1 EURO 4 EURO 8 EURO EURO (0 to 8 EURO)
1.5 EURO 3.5 EURO 9.5 EURO EURO (0 to 9.5 EURO)
2 EURO 3 EURO 11 EURO EURO (0 to 11 EURO)
2.5 EURO 2.5 EURO 12.5 EURO EURO (0 to 12.5 EURO)
3 EURO 2 EURO 14 EURO EURO (0 to 14 EURO)
3.5 EURO 1.5 EURO 15.5 EURO EURO (0 to 15.5 EURO)
4 EURO 1 EURO 17 EURO EURO (0 to 17 EURO)
4.5 EURO 0.5 EURO 18.5 EURO EURO (0 to 18.5 EURO)
5 EURO 0 EURO 20 EURO EURO (0 to 20 EURO)
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Receiver 4
You are the receiver. The sender is a girl with foreign parents. How much do you
want to send back to her? Please fill in an amount for each possible case (at most
one decimal place = 10-cent steps.)
Assume the sender
has sent you the fol-
lowing amount:
The sender still
has:
You have: Which amount
do you want to
send back:
Potential amount
to send back:
0 EURO 5 EURO 5 EURO EURO (0 to 5 EURO)
0.5 EURO 4.5 EURO 6.5 EURO EURO (0 to 6.5 EURO)
1 EURO 4 EURO 8 EURO EURO (0 to 8 EURO)
1.5 EURO 3.5 EURO 9.5 EURO EURO (0 to 9.5 EURO)
2 EURO 3 EURO 11 EURO EURO (0 to 11 EURO)
2.5 EURO 2.5 EURO 12.5 EURO EURO (0 to 12.5 EURO)
3 EURO 2 EURO 14 EURO EURO (0 to 14 EURO)
3.5 EURO 1.5 EURO 15.5 EURO EURO (0 to 15.5 EURO)
4 EURO 1 EURO 17 EURO EURO (0 to 17 EURO)
4.5 EURO 0.5 EURO 18.5 EURO EURO (0 to 18.5 EURO)
5 EURO 0 EURO 20 EURO EURO (0 to 20 EURO)
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Receiver 5
You are the receiver. The sender is a boy with foreign parents who possesses
German citizenship. How much do you want to send back to him? Please fill in an
amount for each possible case (at most one decimal place = 10-cent steps.)
Assume the sender
has sent you the fol-
lowing amount:
The sender still
has:
You have: Which amount
do you want to
send back:
Potential amount
to send back:
0 EURO 5 EURO 5 EURO EURO (0 to 5 EURO)
0.5 EURO 4.5 EURO 6.5 EURO EURO (0 to 6.5 EURO)
1 EURO 4 EURO 8 EURO EURO (0 to 8 EURO)
1.5 EURO 3.5 EURO 9.5 EURO EURO (0 to 9.5 EURO)
2 EURO 3 EURO 11 EURO EURO (0 to 11 EURO)
2.5 EURO 2.5 EURO 12.5 EURO EURO (0 to 12.5 EURO)
3 EURO 2 EURO 14 EURO EURO (0 to 14 EURO)
3.5 EURO 1.5 EURO 15.5 EURO EURO (0 to 15.5 EURO)
4 EURO 1 EURO 17 EURO EURO (0 to 17 EURO)
4.5 EURO 0.5 EURO 18.5 EURO EURO (0 to 18.5 EURO)
5 EURO 0 EURO 20 EURO EURO (0 to 20 EURO)
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Receiver 6
You are the receiver. The sender is a girl with foreign parents who possesses
German citizenship. How much do you want to send back to her? Please fill in an
amount for each possible case (at most one decimal place = 10-cent steps.)
Assume the sender
has sent you the fol-
lowing amount:
The sender still
has:
You have: Which amount
do you want to
send back:
Potential amount
to send back:
0 EURO 5 EURO 5 EURO EURO (0 to 5 EURO)
0.5 EURO 4.5 EURO 6.5 EURO EURO (0 to 6.5 EURO)
1 EURO 4 EURO 8 EURO EURO (0 to 8 EURO)
1.5 EURO 3.5 EURO 9.5 EURO EURO (0 to 9.5 EURO)
2 EURO 3 EURO 11 EURO EURO (0 to 11 EURO)
2.5 EURO 2.5 EURO 12.5 EURO EURO (0 to 12.5 EURO)
3 EURO 2 EURO 14 EURO EURO (0 to 14 EURO)
3.5 EURO 1.5 EURO 15.5 EURO EURO (0 to 15.5 EURO)
4 EURO 1 EURO 17 EURO EURO (0 to 17 EURO)
4.5 EURO 0.5 EURO 18.5 EURO EURO (0 to 18.5 EURO)
5 EURO 0 EURO 20 EURO EURO (0 to 20 EURO)
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Appenxix C: Are Decisions to Cooperate Explained by
Preferences or Beliefs?
As discussed in the main text, in the investment game, there are typically two underlying motives for
cooperating: the sender’s beliefs about whether her choice to cooperate will be exploited by opponents
and individual preferences such as other-regarding concerns and risk aversion (see, e.g., Karlan [2005];
McEvily et al. [2012]; Sapienza et al. [2013]).
As part of our design, we have elicited the expectations of senders regarding the back-transfer behavior
of receivers. We have done this in a simple manner: after the investment stage, we asked participants to
indicate how much they expect to receive back from the six possible receiver types (henceforth denoted
Ek, k = {1, ..., 6} ). Based on this, we first construct a measure of a participant’s belief about whether
receiver type k’s will exploit her decision to give money; it is the share of the total resources available
to the receiver that she expects to receive back: EXk = Ek/(5 + 3Sk). If EXk is high, the sender
expects that receiver type k will not to exploit the vulnerability that she has created for herself by
sending Sk. If EXk is low, the opposite is the case. For a measure of a participant’s beliefs about being
exploited by in-group versus out-group opponents, we collapse the six expectations {EX1, ..., EX6} into
the two variables, EXN =
1
2
(EX1 + EX2) and EXI =
1
4
(EX3 + EX4 + EX5 + EX6), and then define
in-group/group gap in beliefs as follows:
∆EX =
{
EXN − EXI for native children;
EXI − EXN for immigrant children.
Second, given that we have employed the strategy method, we can use individuals’ behavior as receivers
as an indication of their other-regarding preferences, as have many researchers before us. Recall that we
used the contingent response method to elicit back transfers: each participant was asked to decide on
the their back transfers to the six possible sender types k, contingent on the eleven possible investment
(henceforth indexed by m) of sender types k. Let Bkm denote an individual’s back transfer to sender
type k = {1, ..., 6} who has send an amount m = {0, 0.5, 1...4, 4.5, 5}, and let SPkm = Bkm/(5 + Skm)
be the share that the receiver transfers back to sender type k of the total amount she has after sender
type k has send the amount m. Our main proxy for a person’s other-regarding preference towards sender
type k is SPk =
1
11
∑
SPkm, i.e., the receiver’s “back transfer share” to k averaged over the 11 possible
investments from sender type k. For a measure of a participant’s asymmetric other-regarding preferences
to in-group versus out-group opponents, we collapse the six “back transfer shares” {SP1, ..., SP6} into
the two variables, SPN =
1
2
(SP1 + SP2) and SPI =
1
4
(SP3 + SP4 + SP5 + SP6), and then define
in-group/group gap in other-regarding preferences as follows:
∆SP =
{
SPN − SPI for native children;
SPI − SPN for immigrant children.
Finally, our survey contains a question on risk attitudes. In particular, we asked participants: “Are you
generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” Participants
were asked to tick a box on the scale 0 to 10, where the value 0 means “not at all willing to take risks”
and the value 10 means “very willing to take risks”.
With these three measure, we are able to empirically examine the extent to which the investment
behavior of senders is driven by beliefs, other-regarding preferences and risk attitudes. In a first step, we
run a simple regression of participants’ in-group investments on the above-defined measures of their risk
attitudes, their social preferences towards in-group members, and their beliefs about in-group members’
tendency to exploit them (while controlling for age in months). The results, which are reported in Table
C.1, shows that senders’ in-group behavior is driven both by beliefs and social preferences; this is in line
with the findings of Sapienza et al. [2013].
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Table C.1
Explaining In-Group Investment Behavior
Dependent Variable: In-group Investments
Immigrant Boys Immigrant Girls Native Boys Native Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social preferences toward in-group 0.335*** 0.424*** 0.348*** 0.323***
(0.063) (0.053) (0.043) (0.043)
Beliefs about being exploited by in-group 0.282*** 0.115** 0.377*** 0.292***
(0.063) (0.055) (0.044) (0.044)
Risk attitudes 0.042 0.025 0.001 0.072
(0.060) (0.050) (0.043) (0.042)
Age 0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.010
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 509 508 1,051 919
R-squared 0.113 0.145 0.145 0.136
Notes: Results from four OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Proxies for social preferences, beliefs,
and risk attitudes have been transformed into standardized variables with mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
Table C.2
Explaining In-Group/Out-Group Investment Gaps
Dependent Variable: In-group/Out-group Investment Gap (IC)
Immigrant Boys Immigrant Girls Native Boys Native Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asymmetry in social preferences (∆SP ) 0.136*** 0.188*** 0.264*** 0.167***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.023) (0.021)
Asymmetry in exploitation beliefs (∆EX) 0.056 0.081** 0.065*** 0.107***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.019) (0.026)
Risk attitudes -0.004 -0.018 0.045** 0.014
(0.040) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022)
Age -0.002 -0.005 0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Observations 509 508 1,049 917
R-squared 0.035 0.076 0.120 0.083
Notes: Results from four OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Proxies for social preferences, beliefs,
and risk attitudes have been transformed into standardized variables with mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one. ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level.
In a second step, we regress the in-group/out-group investment gap on measures that capture in-
group/out-group differences in participants’ beliefs and preferences. The results are reported in Table
C.2. Here, the main finding is that immigrants’ in-group favoritism is to a large extent explained by
differences in other-regarding preferences toward in-group and out-group members and only to a small
extent by asymmetric beliefs. For example, the estimates for immigrant boys in Column (1) show that
a one standard deviation increase in the in-group/out-group gap in social preferences is associated with
an increase in the in-group/out-group investment gap of e 0.14, while the correlation between the in-
group/out-group gap in beliefs and in-group/out-group investment gap is only one-third that. A similar
conclusion applies to immigrant girls. This suggest that immigrants’ in-group favoritism has a preference-
based explanation and, as such, might also be thought of as discrimination.
Finally, we analyze how in-group/out-group behavior affects payoffs (in expected terms). The results
of this exercise are reported in Table C.3. The first three rows of the table show that first-movers do
better in terms of expected payoffs when matched with an in-group rather than an out-group opponent,
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Table C.3
Calculation of Payoff Losses Due to In-Group Favoritism
Natives Immigrants
All Boys Girls All Boys Girls
Expected in-group payoffs 7.27 7.38 7.13 7.22 7.23 7.21
Expected out-group payoffs 6.99 7.06 6.90 7.04 7.09 6.99
In-group/out-group payoff gap 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.14 0.22
Marginal out-group payoffs 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.46
In-group/out-group investment gap 0.07 0.14 -0.02 0.35 0.28 0.40
% of the in-group/out-group payoff
gap due to trust discrimination 8.8% 15.8% 0% 91.4% 96% 83.6%
Notes: Expected in-group payoffs (respectively, expected out-group payoffs) are the payoffs a participant can expect
when randomly matched to a second-mover of his or her own migration background (respectively, a second-mover
who is not of his or her own migration background). Marginal out-group payoffs are the slopes between expected
out-group payoffs and out-group investments estimated from OLS regressions. The share of the in-group/out-group
payoff gap due to trust discrimination is therefore the ratio of the product between marginal out-group payoffs and
the in-group/out-group investment gap to the in-group/out-group payoff gap.
a result that holds for both natives and immigrants. The table then goes on to provide back-of-the-
envelope calculations of the shares of the in-group/out-group payoff gaps that are due to own in-group
favoritism in giving money (as opposed to the shares of the payoff gaps that are due to differences in
back transfers by in-group and out-group second-movers, respectively). For immigrants, we observe that
the in-group/out-group payoff gap is almost entirely explained by their own in-group favoritism when
sending money (96% of the gap for boys, 84% of the gap for girls). For natives, by contrast, only a small
share of the in-group/out-group payoff gap stems from their in-group favoritism as first movers (16% of
the gap for boys, 0% of the gap for girls). This, in turn, implies that their monetary losses when matched
with out-group opponents can, to a large extent, by the decisions made by in-group vs. out-group second-
movers. To summarize, in our experiment, being matched with an out-group opponents involves a loss of
money, compared to being matched with an in-group opponents. For immigrants, these losses are largely
explained by their own in-group favoritism as first-movers. For natives, the payoff losses are largely
explained by the fact they receive lower back transfers from immigrant than from native opponents.
Taken together, the findings presented in this appendix suggests that immigrants’ social exchange
behavior is shaped by parochial altruism (Choi and Bowles [2007]). In general, parochial altruism involves,
at the same time, strong prosocial behavior towards fellow group members and hostility toward individuals
not of one’s own ethnic, racial, or other group. Of course, our setup does not allow to make claims about
“hostility”, but there is close analogy to it here: immigrants’ low out-group cooperation as first-movers
and their back-transfer behavior as second-movers harms (monetarily) natives and involves at the same
time a willingness to sacrifice money.
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